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ABSTRACT
Quantitative studies have focused on economics, social structures, and lack of political
freedoms as being elemental factors for civil war onset. However, these studies have neglected
the possibility of a civil war being an unintended consequence of international military
intervention. I conduct an empirical analysis of the association between military intervention
and civil war onset by collecting data for twenty countries within the Middle East/North African
regions from 1980 to 2000. Using the International Military Intervention data set, I categorized
“international intervention” into nine different types, all of which were regressed with intrastate
war data derived from the Correlates of War project. Two logit regression analyses were used to
obtain the results, one of which analyzes civil war at time t and the independent variables at t-1.
Additionally, marginal effects were computed to reflect accurate estimates. Overall, the data
revealed that certain types of interventions are conducive to civil war onset, such as those
pursuing terrorists or rebel groups across the border, gaining or retaining territory, and
humanitarian interventions. Other types of interventions, such as those for social protection
purposes, taking sides in a domestic dispute, and for the purpose of affecting policies of the
target country, has a negative association with civil war onset. Two case studies, the 1953 U.S.
intervention into Iran and the 1979 Soviet Union intervention into Afghanistan, reflects the
observed findings of the two regression models.
The occurrences of international military interventions and civil wars have increased
iii

dramatically since the end of World War II; therefore, it is important to have a better
understanding of the association between the two events. To my knowledge, this is the first
study that has categorized different types of interventions under which results indicate that the
purpose of a military intervention does effect the likelihood of civil war onset. Scholars may
develop this study further with the goal of establishing a better understanding of both phenomena
so that we can find more efficient ways of preventing them.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, intrastate war has been the dominant form of conflict
while becoming more serious both in intensity and duration than interstate wars. In fact, among
the 225 general conflicts that occurred in the world from 1946 to 2001, 163 of the conflicts have
been identified as internal conflicts.1 Perhaps what is more alarming is that ninety-five of these
internal conflicts have occurred in the short period between 1989 and 2001.2 The figure below
demonstrates intrastate war experiencing a short decline in 2001, then proceeds to increase in
2003.
The consequences of intrastate conflict are often devastating, resulting in displaced
citizens, economic turmoil, regional instability, and often result in the creation of havens that
breed terrorists. Because of the severity and robust increase in intrastate conflict, scholars are
finding it increasingly important to understand the causes of these conflicts, in addition to
conditions existing in a particular state that make it more prone to civil war.
One condition in particular is whether the state experiencing the intrastate war was victim
of a foreign intervention prior to the civil war breaking out. International military intervention is
nothing new. In fact, it has been occurring for centuries and has consequently created the world
order as it is today.
1

Nils Gleditsch, et a., “Armed Conflict 1946 – 2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no.5 (2002),

616.
2

Ibid.

1

Figure 1. The Number of State-Based Armed Conflict by Type, 1946-2007
Source: 2008 Uppsula Conflict Data Program/Peace and Conflict Research.
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However, the advents of global mobility and aeronautical technology have made
international military intervention become easier, quicker, and much more intense now than it
was a century ago.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between international military
intervention and civil war onset, generally, and whether the purpose of the intervention makes a
difference as to whether or not civil war is likely to ensue, specifically. It must be noted that
discussing foreign intervention as a result of civil war exceeds the scope of this thesis. Rather, I
am analyzing the link between a foreign military intervention occurring, and civil war onset
resulting. Several scholars have suggested that specific conditions existing within a state make
civil war more likely to occur. This thesis analyzes whether or not foreign military intervention
is a condition that precipitates civil war.
Because modern resources have made it relatively easy for one state to intervene into
another, governments often have a variety of reasons as to why it is intervening into a sovereign
state. I examine nine different purposes of intervention: social protection for citizens in the state
being intervened, pursuing rebel or terrorists forces across the border, protecting economic
interests, intervention for humanitarian purposes, intervention for acquisition or retention of
territory, intervening for strategic purposes in terms of pursuing ideological goals, protecting
military and/or diplomatic interests of the intervener, taking sides in a domestic dispute, and
intervening for the purpose of affecting domestic policies of the target state.
3

When intervening, states have the option to do so unilaterally or multilaterally, in
addition to taking a military or non-military approach. Only unilateral military interventions are
of interest in this work. As we see in chapter five, the purpose of the intervention does effect
whether civil war onset will occur within the target state.

Research Question
The research questions this thesis seeks to answer are twofold: foreign military
intervention does facilitate civil war onset. However, the type of foreign military intervention
strongly effects whether or not civil war onset will occur. To answer these questions, I gathered
data on intrastate wars that have occurred in 20 countries located in the Middle Eastern /
North African regions during a twenty-year period, (from 1980 to 2000).
I also collected data on international military interventions that have occurred within
those countries and the same time period. Because a foreign intervention can have long-term
effects on the intervened country, it is a basic assumption in this thesis that if a civil war
occurred within one year following an intervention, there is an association between the two
events.

Originality
Although there has been ample work done on the causes of civil war, there has been no
association between foreign military intervention and civil war onset. Similarly, there is an
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abundance of literature regarding foreign military intervention in general, but the focus of those
findings are typically restricted to either third-party interventions in civil wars or justifications of
doing such without any regard to its effect on causing civil war.
Furthermore, there is little literature that categorizes the purposes of interventions; rather,
“intervention” is considered to be all-encompassing. Generalizing “intervention” can be
potentially misleading because the term itself means „intrusion‟ or „interference‟ and implies acts
that encourage war. 3 However, there are purposes of intervention whereby the motivation for
direct interference is benign, such as humanitarian or social protection interventions.
Although mere imperialism or colonialism may have been the main driving motivation in
the past, modern advances in technology and simplicity have given government leaders
expansive purposes to intervene into another country. Therefore, it is highly statistically useful
to disaggregate the different types of intervention purposes so that government leaders are better
able to predict what the potential consequences of intervening into a country will be, notably
civil war.
Of the nine categories of purposes of intervention explored in this thesis, the data reveal
that civil war onset is positively associated with interventions for the purpose of
pursuing a terrorists or rebel across the target country‟s border, humanitarian interventions,
acquiring or retaining territory, and protecting military property, diplomatic, and economic
3

Herbert K. Tillema, “Foreign Overt Military Intervention in the Nuclear Age,” Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 2

(1989), 180.

5

interests.
By contrast, interventions for purpose of affecting social policies of the target country,
taking sides in a domestic dispute, social protection, and strategic inventions with the purpose of
advancing ideological goals all have a negative association with civil war onset. These results
invite questions as to why this pattern exists, and whether there are other factors that make a
country more prone to civil war. Such questions are explored in the next chapter.

Roadmap
Following this chapter is the literature review, which indicates two strands of scholarship:
civil war and foreign military intervention. The former addresses the causes of civil war and
conditions that are conducive to civil war onset. The latter strand of scholarship discusses the
nine purposes of intervention in detail. The third chapter discusses the overall theoretical
intuition, which involves three theories that attempt to explain why civil war occurs. Also,
understanding why countries intervene in others is best explained by the Realist school of
thought.4 Arguably since international security and power considerations are critical factors that
shape the foreign policy behavior of states.
The fourth chapter discusses the methodology of this study, which include the
justification for selecting the Middle Eastern/North African regions for the years 1980 and 2000.
I will also explain the advantages and disadvantages of conducting a pooled cross-sectional time
4

Todd Hitchcock, “Realism Theories.” Chapter 2 in International Relations Theory. Pearson Education (2014), 39.
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series, in addition to discussing the data sources, variables, and hypotheses. The fifth chapter
will explain the results of the two regression models, which will determine whether any
hypotheses were correct. Chapter five will also include the limitations in this study as well as
areas for future research.
The sixth chapter introduces two case studies: the 1953 United States led
intervention into Iran (codenamed “Operation AJAX”) and the 1979 Soviet Union intervention
into Afghanistan. The U.S. and the Soviet Union intervened in countries in the same region for
the purpose of both strategy and choosing sides in a domestic dispute, yet civil war broke out in
Afghanistan, but not in Iran. The data results are consistent with the two case studies, which is
elaborated on in chapter six.
The seventh chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the overall thesis. There are
three appendices: appendix A lists all of the interventions, categorized by type, that were used in
this study, in addition to a brief description of each. Appendix B lists the civil wars that were
analyzed in this study, and also gives a brief description of each. Finally, appendix C provides
the exact year that data were collected for Alesina‟s fractionalization data set, discussed in detail
in chapter four.

7

CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE

The literature review will begin by explaining how civil war is measured in this thesis.
Scholars often offer their own operationalization of civil war as there is no standard operational
definition to follow; therefore, it is imperative to discuss whose measurement of civil war that I
will be using. Additionally, I will make the distinction between “civil war” and “armed
conflict,” as the terms are often mistakenly used interchangeably despite having entirely different
meanings and criteria.
This chapter then divides into two strands of scholarship: the first pertinent only to civil
war and the second discussing the work done on foreign military interventions. I will begin the
discussion of the civil war strand by briefly examining the motivations and feasibility of
engaging in civil war on an individualistic level. I will also introduce competing arguments
explaining why individuals rebel and incentives they may have in doing so.
Still within the civil war strand, I will then present several arguments offered by scholars
on the causes of civil war such as ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity within a state, the
economic status of the state, regime type, extent of political freedoms, and the effect that natural
resources have on instigating civil war. Additionally, some scholars argue that conditions such
as terrain, population size, and whether the country was previously colonized are also conducive
to civil war onset; therefore, those arguments will also be discussed.
The second strand (foreign military intervention) will discuss in detail the nine different
8

purposes of intervention. As mentioned in the previous chapter, neither the consequences nor
effects that foreign military intervention have on civil wars themselves will be discussed.
Instead, I adhere only to the actual purpose or motivation of the intervention itself. Long-term
consequences of foreign intervention will also be explored, as many have been shown to alter the
conditions within the intervening state, which could facilitate or contribute to the likelihood of
civil war onset.

Measuring Civil War
To understand civil war, we must first be able to describe it, and this may be particularly
true of war given that it consistently changes over time. In the empirical literature, there has
been incredible growth in studies due to the compilation of quantitative data sets; yet, there is no
consensus as to how civil war should be measured.5 Since I use the Correlates of War (COW)
intrastate war data set (version 4.0), I will use the COW Project‟s operationalization of “civil
war.”
Prior to 1994, the COW project defined a “civil war” as any armed conflict that involved:
(1) military action internal to the metropole; (2) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths
during each year of the war; (3) the active participation of the national government; and, (4)

5

Nicholas Sambanis, “What is civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition.”

Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004), 815.
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effective resistance by both sides.6 The metropole refers to areas integrated under the central
government, whereas nonintegrated areas (the periphery) faced restrictive governmental
provisions.7 To be considered a civil war, the military action had to occur within the boundaries
of the metropole.
A territory was regarded as part of the metropole if there were no constitutional
provisions denying the subjects the right to participate in the government. The federal district
was considered to be integrated if there were no restrictive provisions based on ethnicity, race, or
religion.8
In 1994, the COW Project began slightly modifying and updating its war typology and
coding rules. The reasoning for these changes included the desire to: expand the war typology to
include additional types of armed conflict, modify the metropole distinction, change the coding
of some of the variables to make them more comparable to all of the war types, and, to alter
some of the coding practices that had been perceived as “Eurocentric.”9 Also, there were a
number of growing armed conflicts that did not fit comfortably within the existing COW
categories; therefore, the COW project refined its criteria of what is now referred to as “intrastate
war,” as opposed to the formerly used “civil war.”
6

Meredith Reid Sarkees, et al., “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their

Disribution over Time, 1816-1997.” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003), 57.
7

Ibid., 58.

8

M. Small and J.D. Singer (1982). Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980. Beverly Hills, CA:

Sage Publications.
9

Ibid.
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More broadly, Small and Singer changed the criteria of being a legitimate member of the
international community. Historically, a state had to have a population of 500,000, it had to be
sovereign, and it had to be recognized as such by the United Nations.10 However, the criteria has
been changed to only reflect the necessary recognition by the international community, most
notably through the United Nations as the territory being intervened belonging to that the state.11
Currently, “intrastate war” is based on the following main characteristics: (1) mutual
military action was involved; (2) there must be at least 1,000 battle deaths during the course of
the civil war; (3) the national government at the time was actively involved; and, (4) there must
be effective resistance, which is measured by the ratio of the weaker to the strong forces that
occurred on both sides.12
With regard to the first criterion, the primary change in the new typology was removing
the distinction between the metropole and the periphery within intrastate war.13 Thus, all
military action resulting in war that takes place within the recognized territory of a state will
automatically fall under the intrastate war category; whereas, a non-state entity outside its border
will be considered an extra-systemic war.
Additionally, the requirement of mutual military action is instrumental in distinguishing

10

Small and Singer, 211-12.

11

Sarkees, et al., “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars,” 59.

12

Meredith Sarkees and Phil Schafer, “The Correlates of War Data on War: an Update to 1997,” Conflict

Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1 (2000), 126.
13

Sarkees, et al., “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars,” 60.
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intrastate war from one-sided violence, such as massacres.14 Thus, incidents that involved largescale massacres of disarmed combatants or prisoners outside of combat operations will not be
considered mutual military action. Consequently, condition one will not be met.15 Also, “hideand-seek” operations that do not involve any combat over an extended period of time but
nonetheless kills several troops through disease will also not be considered military action.16
With regard to the second criterion, Small and Singer modified the type of member to be
considered in the 1,000 battle death threshold. Before discussing this modification, it must first
be noted that authors frequently use the terms deaths and casualties interchangeably, despite the
different meanings whereby the latter includes both those who died and the number wounded.
Keep in mind, the COW Project includes only the number of deaths to meet the 1,000 threshold;
causalities are not included.17
Prior to 1994, Small and Singer included civilian deaths in this 1,000 battle-death figure
because it was difficult to distinguish the combatants from the civilian population.18 However,
including the non-state-participant deaths in the total number of deaths to meet the 1,000
threshold had significantly increased the number extra-state wars, and was not properly
categorizing the intrastate from the extra-state wars.19 Therefore, the current requirement for
14

Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4

of the Data),” 13. Correlates of War homepage, www.correlatesofwar.org (accessed December 4, 2014).
15

Ibid.

16

Ibid., 14.

17

Ibid., 16.

18

Ibid., 17.
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the 1,000 battle-related deaths include only those among the qualified war participants. This
includes personnel killed in combat as well as those who subsequently died from combat
wounds or diseases contracted during the war.20
Additionally, the 1,000 threshold has been relaxed to reflect 1,000 battle-deaths in total,
as opposed to annually. However, Small and Singer have been criticized for abandoning the
annual death threshold because an end to the war would be coded when violence dropped below
1,000 deaths. Since there is no longer an annual death count, multiple war start dates could be
coded in what is essentially the same conflict, should levels of violence fluctuate widely.21
Organized armed forces are a requirement in the definition of war, and since most states
possess them, the members of the interstate system were considered to be the predominant actor
in war. Membership in the interstate system was based on criteria of population, territory,
sovereignty, independence, and diplomatic recognition. A state is to be qualified as a war
participant by meeting either one of the two criteria: a minimum of 100 domestic fatalities or a
minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat.22
Since non-state armed groups are generally smaller than states and have fewer resources
than states, the individual does not have to meet the above mentioned requirements to be
considered as a war participant. Instead, the non-state armed groups are considered to be a war
19

Ibid.

20

Ibid., 15.

21

Sambanis, 819.

22

Sarkees, “Codebook for the COW Typology of War,” 18.
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participant if it either commits 100 armed personnel to the war or suffers twenty-five battlerelated deaths.23
Once the participants in the war have been identified, researchers must determine who is
fighting whom within the state. The party that caused the greatest number of battle-deaths was
considered to be doing the bulk of the fighting; this ensures that researchers are properly
identifying war participants that are engaged in the violence that is at the core of the war.24
The third criterion, the active involvement of the national government, requires that the
government of the state fight against a non-state entity.25 The central government is defined as
those forces that were at the start of the war in de facto control of the nation‟s institutions,
regardless of the legality or illegality of their claim.26
The COW Project considers national military forces, local police, and citizens who do
not rebel, to be considered as part of the government.27 The non-state participants can include
regional geopolitical units, non-territorial entities, or non-state armed groups that have no
defined territorial bases, so long as the war is fought within the borders of the state.
The last criterion, effective resistance, requires that for a conflict to be considered a war,
it must involve armed forces capable of effective resistance on both sides.28 There are two
23

Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State War V.4.0. Definitions and Variables,” 4. Correlates of

War homepage, www.correlatesofwar.org (accessed December 6, 2014).
24

Sarkees, “Codebook for the COW Typology of War,” 19.

25

Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State War,” 2.

26

Ibid., 2-3.

27

Ibid., 3.
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criteria for defining effective resistance, the first being that both sides had to be initially
organized for violent conflict while being prepared to resist the attacks of their opponent. The
second is that the weaker side must be able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five
percent of the number of fatalities it sustains, despite being unprepared to do so. The purpose of
this last criterion is to differentiate intrastate wars from massacres or general riots by
unorganized individuals.29
When determining whether an armed conflict constitutes as an intrastate war, it is
important to measure the duration of the conflict. The duration typically relies on the war‟s start
date, end date, and breaks in the hostilities. The COW project considers intrastate war‟s formal
declaration as being the opening date, but only if it is followed immediately by sustained military
combat.30 Should the hostilities precede the formal declaration, then the first day of combat is
used. In the event that there is no declaration, then the sustained continuation of military battle,
producing the requisite number of battle deaths, is treated as war with the first day of combat
used for computing duration.31
The end date of the armed conflict may be an armistice or cease-fire agreement, as long
as the conflict does not resume thereafter.32 If the armistice fails to halt the hostilities or there is

28

Ibid., 2.

29

Ibid.

30

Small and Singer, 66.

31

Ibid.

32

“Codebook for the COW Typology of War,” 20.
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a delay between the cessation of military action, then the end date is the day that clearly
separates the close of sustained military conflict. Essentially, an intrastate war ends if: (1) there
is a truce or other agreement that ends combat for a year or more; (2) the apparent defeat of one
side, assuming there is no formal surrender or truce; or, (3) twelve consecutive months pass
without 1,000 battle-deaths, in which the termination date of the war would be the last day that
the 1,000 threshold was met during the previous twelve months.33
An exception to properly calculating a war‟s duration is if there is a break in the fighting.
If the fighting stopped for 30 days or less, then there is not considered to be a break. However,
if there was a cessation of hostilities that occurred for more than 30 days, then there was
considered to be a break, in which the end date would be noted and a second start date would be
noted when the war resumed.34 Breaks are not considered when measuring the overall duration
of the war.
Sambanis offers a much more detailed measurement of civil war that is much different
than the definition offered by the COW. First, the parties must be politically and militarily
organized, and their political objectives must be publically stated. Similar to the COW, the
government must be a principal combatant.
However, Sambanis argues that in the absence of a functioning government, the party
representing the government, or claiming to control the state domestically, must be a combatant
33

Ibid., 21.

34

Ibid., 22.
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in order to be considered an internal conflict.35 He also insists that insurgency groups must be
locally represented and must recruit locally.
Furthermore, the start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500
to 1,000 deaths. If the death total is not reached, then the war is considered to have started in
that year only if the cumulative deaths in the next three years reach 1,000.36 However, this
presents a problem with wars that do not reach 500 in the first year because researchers may not
know whether the conflict should be considered a civil war until after three years, should the
death count not reach 1,000. This additional stipulation could create prolonged confusion among
researchers in regards to labeling the conflict improperly.
Like Small and Singer, Sambanis also includes “effective resistance” in his measurement
of civil war; however he requires the weaker party to inflict at least 100 deaths on the stronger
party to qualify as effective resistance. Sambanis also argues that if the fighting ceases and
peace results for at least two years, then the civil war is considered to have ended.37 However, he
offers no justification as to why there must be two years of peace, and not one or three. It would
be useful for readers to better understand his measurement of civil war if he explained why he
requires two years of peace, as opposed to any other time period.
Finally, Sambanis insists that the war must take place within the territory of a state that is
35

Sambanis, 829.

36

Ibid., 830.

37

Ibid., 831.
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a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater.38 Although the per
capita death measure would allow the population threshold to be relaxed, it still presents a
problem for those countries that have a population of less than 500,000, yet meet all other
conditions to constitute as a “civil war.”
For example, Malta has a population of 419,000 while Iceland has a population of only
332,000, yet both are completely sovereign states that are recognized as such by the international
community.39 It seems fallacious that the death count during a conflict is required to exceed the
normal threshold of 1,000 battle deaths simply because the population is not greater than
500,000.
Fearon and Laitin also have their own operationalization of “civil war,” in that it involves
fighting between a state and non-state group who seek to take control of a government, take
power in a region, or use violence in order to change government policies to achieve certain
goals.40 Additionally, the conflict must have killed 1,000 people over the course of the fighting
period, with a yearly average of at least 100 deaths. Finally, at least 100 civilians and/or
participants must have been killed on both sides to constitute as a “civil war.”

38

Ibid. at 829

39

“Population, Total.” The World Bank,

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_
value-last&sort=asc, (December 26 2014).
40

James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal of Peace Research

41, no. 3 (2004), 278.
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The last criterion is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or
effective opposition; however, including civilian deaths may still categorize the conflict as “civil
war” despite being terrorist attacks or ethnic cleansings. Another criticism is the overall 1,000
deaths: it is too low because under this criterion, a conflict may continue for twenty years and
still be labeled as a “civil war,” so long as there are 1,000 deaths, with 100 occurring annually.
This relaxed approach inappropriately classifies low levels of violence as being civil wars, and
could lead researchers to include cases in which there is no real threat to the state or political
order.
This literature review now turns to the differentiation between “civil war” and “armed
conflict,” as the two are often inappropriately used. “Civil war” must not be confused with
“armed conflict;” rather, the former is a type of the latter. Armed conflict is defined as a
contested incompatibility that concerns governments or territory or both where the use of armed
force between two parties results in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths.41
Armed conflict is divided into three main subsets: (1) minor armed conflict; (2)
intermediate armed conflict; and, (3) civil war. Minor armed conflict consists of at least twentyfive battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of
the conflict.
Intermediate armed conflict consists of at least twenty-five battle-related deaths per

41

Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict 1946 – 2001,” 618-9.
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year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year.
Civil war requires at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.42 Armed conflict is generally
used to measure the level of intensity of conflict. However, in this thesis, I am only concerned
with the third subset of armed conflict: civil war.
Similarly, armed conflicts are also distinguished by type. Following the COW Project‟s
definitions, there four different types of armed conflict: first, there is interstate armed conflict,
which occurs between two or more states. Second, extrastate armed conflict, which occurs
between a state and non-state group outside its own territory. Armed conflict is also divided into
colonial war and imperial wars.
The third type is internationalized internal armed conflict, which occurs between the
government of a state and internal opposition groups with interventions from other states.
Finally, there is internal armed conflict, which occurs between the government of a state and
internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.
This thesis focuses only on internal armed conflict, which is also referred to as either
“intrastate war” or “civil war.” The reasoning for the interchangeability is because different
scholars refer to internal conflict as either an “intrastate war” or “civil war,” despite having the
same meaning. Therefore, to be consistent with the literature, each word will be referenced as
the author uses it, bearing in mind that the two terms have essentially the same meaning.
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Causes of Civil War
Between 1989 and 2000, there have been a staggering 465 conflicts, while there have
been a relatively modest 19 intrastate conflicts with foreign intervention, and 18 interstate
conflicts.43 This disparity in the quantity of these conflicts is curious and has led political
scientists to conduct empirical research in the attempt to discover the causes of these multifarious
wars. Table 1 illustrates the quantity of armed conflicts between 1989 and 2000.
Over the past decade, there have been numerous quantitative studies that have been
published with little consensus among scholars as to what directly causes civil war onset. Some
scholars have argued that ethnic and religious fractionalization are strong determinants of civil
war onset.44 While advocates of the “ethnic fractionalization fueling internal conflict” argument
may agree that ethnic diversity is conducive to civil war onset, the reasoning varies widely.
Tanja Ellingsen (2000) analyzes the relationship between multiethnic states and domestic
conflict from 1946 to 1992 to determine if, and to what extent, ethnicity influenced civil war
onset.45 Ellingsen looks at three different aspects of multiehtnicity that may influence whether a
country becomes involved in domestic conflict or not.46
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Table 1. Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict, 1989-2000
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Type of
Conflict

1996 1997

1998

1999

2000

Intrastate

43

44

49

52

42

42

34

33

30

33

33

30

Intrastate
with
Foreign
Invnt.
Interstate

1

2

1

2

4

0

0

1

3

2

2

1

3

3

1

1

0

0

1

2

1

2

2

2

All Armed
Conflicts

47

49

51

55

46

42

35

36

34

37

37

33
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The first is the degree of fragmentation within a country, being both the size and number
of the largest linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups. Ellingsen found that countries in which the
size of the dominant group is less than 80 percent of the total population are more prone to
domestic conflict than countries in which the dominant group equals or is higher than 80 percent
of the total population.47
The second aspect of multiethnicity is the size of the largest minority group within the
country. The presence of numerous groups often means that each group is small and, in turn, no
minority group is large enough to mobilize to start conflict.48 The data supported her second
hypothesis: conflict is higher in countries with several different ethnic groups than in those with
few ethnic groups.
The third aspect of multiethnicity that Ellingsen explores is the ethnic affinities to other
countries.49 She argues that a minority within one country may be a majority within another.
Consequently, this affects the size of the minority and its identification.50 Therefore, race,
religion, and the language that represents a minority group in one country may not represent a
group within another.51
Ellingsen used Singer and Small‟s Correlates of War data set for civil war data in
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addition to using Wallensteen and Sollenberg‟s data set for armed conflict. Relying on
regression analysis, her overall findings demonstrate that multiethnicity (measured in of the
above-mentioned ways) has a strong and significant impact on domestic conflict.
This is mainly attributed to the state‟s lack of recognizing and strengthening minority
groups in addition to denying them equivalent political and economic rights.52 Giving minority
groups the right to cultural self-expression without fear of political or economic repression could
prevent them from mobilizing and creating conflict within the state.
Although Ellingsen‟s study has shown that multiethnicity within countries often results in
domestic conflict, it does not correlate with countries such as Madagascar, Gabon, or Cameroon,
all of which are highly multiethnic, yet have never experienced a civil war.
For example, according to Alesina‟s, et al.‟s fractionalization data, Madagascar has an
ethnic fractionalization score of .8791.53 The closer the score is to 1.000, the more ethnically
heterogeneous the country is. On the other hand, the closer the score is to 0.000, the more
ethnically homogeneous the country is.54 By having a score .8791, Madagascar is highly
ethnically heterogeneous yet has never experienced a civil war. Similarly, Gabon has an ethnic
fractionalization score of .7691 while Cameroon is even more multiethnic, having a score of
.8635.55
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In the context of Ellingsen‟s reasoning, Madagascar, Gabon, and Cameroon should have
all experienced domestic conflict as a result of being highly multiethnic, yet they have not.
Examining the relative minority size within Madagascar, we find that more than nine-tenths of
the population is Malagasy, which is divided into approximately 20 ethnic groups.56 The largest
and most dominant of the 20 ethnic groups is the Merina, which represents approximately a
quarter of the 23.6 million citizens, while the other nineteen ethnic minority groups represent
only a fraction of the population.
With a population of 1.7 million, Gabon has approximately 40 ethnic groups, in which
the Fang account for more than one-fourth of the population whereas the Sira, the Nzebi, and the
Mbete, jointly account for about one-third of the population. In regards to Ellingsen‟s
measurement of “multiethnicity,” the size of these minority groups are relatively large, yet have
not mobilized to start conflict.57
Finally, Cameroon has a population of 22.5 million, which is represented by an
astounding 250 ethnic groups.58 The Bamileke and the Bamoun constitute 38 percent of
the population while the Bakas account for about 18 percent of the population. The Fulani
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also account for 18 percent while the Bassa accounts for roughly 12 percent. There are several
minority groups that are equal in terms of size, with no ethnic group dominating the overall
population. Therefore, Cameroon meets the criteria for civil war set by Ellingsen, yet the country
has not experienced civil war or domestic conflict.59
What these three countries do have in common is that they are all former colonies of the
French, and have gained their independence in 1960 as a result of the Algerian War. Also, all
three countries currently have republican governments. These striking similarities could help
explain why Madagascar, Gabon, and Cameroon are anomalies to Ellingsen‟s study. However, it
is unlikely that multiethniciy alone will be enough to explain why civil war occurs.
Similar to Ellingsen, Sambanis argues that ethnic heterogeneity is among the most
significant and robust determinants of civil war onset.60 He analyzes the differences that exist
between the causes of identity by means of ethnicity and religion, and nonidentity civil wars by
using a cross-sectional time-series data set that includes economic, social, and political variables
for 161 countries observed annually over a period from 1960 to 1999.61
His findings reveal that politics is more important that economics in causing civil war
because the deprivation of political rights causes repression, and may fuel rebellion against the
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state. Also, ethnic heterogeneity significantly increases the risk of civil war, determined by
using the Ethnolinguistic fractionalization date set, created by Taylor and Hudson in 1972.62
Interestingly, Sambanis also argues that regional characteristics also influence patterns of
civil war onset due to their ethnic makeup, resource endowments, and the degree in which they
include intermeddling countries.63 Civil wars occurring in neighboring countries may increase
the risk of civil war in another due to ethnic groups becoming involved within ethnic conflicts in
other countries.64
Sambanis labels “good neighborhoods” as having open political institutions that are not
prone to internal conflict. Additionally, good neighborhoods are able to help states overcome
their political problems and offer mediation that prevent conflict escalation. By contrast, “bad
neighborhoods” have weak political institutions, which may cause political and economic
grievance in other neighboring countries as a result of uncontrolled domestic ethnic hostility.
The data showed that countries having land borders with countries experiencing civil war
due to ethnic hostilities are significantly more likely to experience a civil war of their own.65
Although regional unrest can certainly contribute to the likelihood of civil war onset in a
neighboring country, Sambanis offers no root-cause explanation as to why civilians would want
to rebel against their own government.
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Surely, there must be an alternative reason as opposed to simply “everyone else is doing
it.” Additionally, Sambanis‟s analysis cannot explain whether the spread of neighboring unrest
fueling civil war is due to ethnic war spreading physically across borders to other ethnic groups
or if information effects influence patterns of mobilization and violent conflict in neighboring
states.66
In the same vein as Sambanis‟s argument for good/bad neighboring countries fueling
civil war, Taydas et al. focuses on the importance of institutional quality.67 He argues that the
absence of good quality institutions and effective governance structures creates suitable
conditions for emergence of civil war.68 Unlike Sambanis, Taydas focuses on the lack of good
quality institutions within the state that is experiencing the civil war, rather than the effect that
these institutions have on neighboring countries.
Taydas‟s overall argument is that states with high institutional-quality levels are less
likely to experience civil war onset.69 This is mainly because these institutions will be
responsive to the needs of their citizens in addition to solving problems beyond the use of only
military action. By contrast, a low institutional quality may lead to states losing the loyalty of its
citizens, which would increase the likelihood of civil war.70
66

Ibid., 275.

67

Ibid.

68

Zeynep Taydas, et al. “Why Do Civil Wars Occur? Understanding the Importance of Institutional Quality.” Civil

Wars 12, no. 2 (2010), 199.
69

Ibid., 196.

70

Ibid.

28

The quality of institutions is measured by three components: corruption in the
government, the rule of law tradition, and bureaucratic quality.71 These three components are
appropriate since they demonstrate the ability of a government to implement institutional norms
and rules that provide services in an efficient and non-discriminatory manner.72
Taydas‟s empirical analysis covers the years 1984 to 1999, in which the International
Country Risk Group (ICRG) data set is used to gauge the quality of institutions.73 124 states are
included in the study, all of which have a population of at least half a million in 1990. The
findings reveal that states with poor institutional quality in the form of high corruption, low
respect for rule of law and poor-quality bureaucratic systems were more likely to experience civil
war.74 By having poor-quality institutions, the legitimacy in the government is decreased, which
creates grievances among the population and can, in turn, facilitate the emergence of conflict.
To measure for corruption, Taydas uses the ICRG‟s measurement of corruption in the
government, which ranges from zero (being the most corrupt) to six (no corruption).75 This
variable measures the following: financial corruption in the form of demands or special
payments, bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments,
police protection, corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, and secret party

71

Ibid., 199.

72

Ibid.

73

Ibid., 202.

74

Ibid., 209.

75

Ibid., 212.

29

funding.76
However, Taydas does not explain how the ICRG gathers its data that includes these
types of corruption. Because corruption is not public information and is most often done in
secrecy, it is incredibly difficult to accurately determine whether officials are indeed corrupt.
Furthermore, Taydas argues that the prevalence of poor governance, which is measured
in the form of corruption, decreases citizens‟ faith and confidence in the political system
altogether.77 It also creates a gap between ordinary citizens and state institutions that generates
distrust, dissatisfaction, and grievances within the entire political system. As this gap widens, the
risk of internal conflict increase and “…existing tensions between groups can worsen.”78
There are two problems with this particular argument: first, it is assumed that the
citizens are aware of the corruption, but the findings do not address situations in which there is
massive governmental corruption, yet the citizens are not aware. If citizens are not aware of the
corruption taking place within the government, then it is unlikely that a gap will be created, thus
neither generating distrust nor dissatisfaction with the political system. Therefore, it would be
useful to not only gauge the corruption within an existing government, but also the citizens‟
awareness of such corruption.
Secondly, Taydas argues that existing tensions between groups could worsen as a
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consequence of citizens‟ distrust with the government; however, he does not address which
groups are being referenced. Thus, it is unclear whether he is referring to ethnic groups, political
organizations, rebel groups, etc.
Overall, Taydas offers a compelling argument on the usefulness of good quality
institutions as a preventative of civil war onset. While I agree that good quality institutions
are immensely important for sustaining peace, it is not the sole cause of civil war onset because
there must be incentives for citizens to rebel, which is not addressed in Taydas‟s study.
Other studies suggest that civil wars generally result from a combination of greed,
opportunity, and grievance. The initial motivation to rebel is the subject of much controversy,
and much of the debate has been based on the „greed versus grievance‟ discourse. Grievance
generally refers to repression or suffering; whereas, opportunity generally refers to rebels having
enough freedom to organize and access to finances, weapons, and soldiers.
With regard to the root cause of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler have introduced their own
conceptual dichotomy of greed versus grievance. Rebellion generally occurs when grievances
are severe enough that citizens want to engage in some type of violent protest.79
Such rebellions are motivated by grievances, which refers to the discontent and
frustration that citizens have due to high economic inequality, ethnic or religious hatred, political
repression, or political exclusion.80 More generally, grievance can also be created from a sense
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of injustice, including relative deprivation, collective disadvantages, and inequality that provide
groups with motivation to use violent means against the government.81 Foreign military
intervention could cause or disrupt any of the four mentioned grievances, thus fueling internal
conflict. This is expounded on later in this chapter.
Contrarily, rebellions that generate profits from looting are motivated by greed, which
then generates profitable opportunities for rebels.82 Oil, diamonds, timber, and other primary
commodities are generally the more contestable resources over which rebels rise against their
respective governments.83 Over the years, Collier and Hoeffler have broadened their original
conceptualization by shifting from greed to “opportunity,” referring to the factors that facilitate
internal violence and influence the feasibility of action, which extends beyond just greed. 84
According to Collier and Hoeffler, civil war is to be viewed as the outcome of an
expected utility calculation; whereby, potential rebels would evaluate their expected gains from
war and compare gains with expected losses.85 This cost-benefit analysis is considered to be
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“opportunity costs” of forgoing productive economic activity. Therefore, rebellion is a rational
decision.
To help explain rebellion, Collier and Hoeffler test three indicators of opportunity and
four indicators of grievances and determine which theory best explains the rebellion
phenomenon.
In an empirical investigation of conflict, Collier and Hoeffler considered three qualitative
indicators of opportunity, namely those that help finance rebellion: extortion of natural resources,
donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments.86 The natural resource
indicator was proxied by the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP for 161 countries over
a period of thirty-five years starting in 1960 and ending in 1995.87 The subsequent five years
was then considered to be an „episode‟ and compared to those in which a civil war occurred and
to those that were conflict-free.
Collier and Hoeffler then proxied the size of a country‟s diaspora, the second source of
rebel finance, by its emigrants living in the United States. By using U.S. Census data, diasporas
living in other countries are neglected; however, doing so ensures uniformity in the aggregate in
that all are in the same legal, organizational, and economic environment.88 The emigrant
population is then taken as a proportion of the population in the country of origin.
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The third source of rebel financing, from hostile governments, is proxied as the
willingness of foreign governments to finance military opposition to the incumbent government.
The data is collected during the Cold War, in which each great power supported rebellions in
countries allied to the opposing power.89 However, eleven of the seventy-nine wars occurred
after the cold war; therefore, results for this variable may be slightly skewed since there is no
data offered for the eleven wars.
The study then turns to four qualitative indicators of grievances mentioned earlier: ethnic
or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality. 90 Since
ethnic and religious hatred can generally only occur in societies that are multi-ethnic or multireligious, the indicator is proxied as fractionalization and polarization.
The second indicator, political repression, was measured by the Polity IV data set, which
measures political right on a scale from zero to ten, with zero meaning no political rights and ten
representing substantial political rights. Political exclusion represents the minority, which may
be most vulnerable if the largest ethnic group constitutes a small majority. If the largest ethnic
group constitutes 45-90 percent of the population, it is referred to as „ethnic dominance,‟ which
results in the exclusion of the minority groups.91
Economic inequality was measured by the GINI coefficient and by the ratio of the top-to-
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bottom quintiles of income; whereas, asset inequality was measured by the GINI coefficient of
land ownership.92
After conducting a logit regression for all seven opportunity and grievance indicators
explained above, the data revealed that extortion of natural resources was highly significant
while subventions from hostile governments was not. The diaspora variable was positive and
significant in that a large diaspora considerably increases the risk of repeat conflict through rebel
financing.93 However, because people tend to emigrate to the United States when civil wars
occur, the size of the diaspora may be proxying the intensity of conflict. In turn, the results may
be spurious and could be why the data indicates that intense conflicts have a high risk of
repetition.
In regards to grievance as the explanation of rebellion indicators, the data revealed that
the ethnic and religious tensions were insignificant. Ethnic and religious fractionalization,
religious polarization, and ethnic dominance were all insignificant.94 As expected, repression
increases the risk of conflict. Finally, neither the income inequality nor land inequality variables
were significant.
As Collier and Hoeffler argue, the results indicate that the opportunities for rebellion
helps to explains civil conflict better than the objective indicators of grievance, which add little
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explanatory power.95

Overall, factors such as inequality, political rights, and ethnic and

religious identity have been ruled out as causing internal conflict. Instead, explaining
opportunity as conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greedmotivated and not grievance-motivated.96
A problem with Collier and Hoeffler‟s study is that they take an individualistic approach
in regards to grievance indicators. The model assumes that every participant of the conflict must
experience inequality, ethnic or religious hatred, political exclusion, or repression. However,
many rebels may not be motivated at all; rather they are simply free riders that seek incentives by
others that have already laid the groundwork.
Additionally, grievance itself is difficult to proxy. For example, researchers cannot
assume that because a state is highly fractionalized or has a dominant ethnic group, the diversity
will fuel ethnic hatred and cause minorities to rebel.
Similarly, it is impossible to know whether a person made the decision to rebel due to
religious polarization, unless of course that person is surveyed or asked directly by the
researcher, both being highly unlikely to produce honest answers. Therefore, because grievance
as motivation is so personal and may be different for every rebel, Collier and Hoeffler are
working with assumptions as opposed to raw data that do in fact represent the rebels‟ motivation
to rebel.
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Regan and Norton argue that grievance-based issues are at the core of the process that
leads to civil conflict, but only becomes salient when rebel leadership begin to have difficultly
motivating soldiers.97 To avoid defection, rebel leaders must pay selective benefits to the rebel
participants.
Doing so is much easier when extractable resources are contested and controlled by the
rebel forces. Therefore, grievance is the foundation by which protest and rebellion movements
occur but resources are necessary to obtain so that selective benefits can be paid to the rebels in
the attempt to keep the rational rebel soldier supporting the rebellion.98 This will, in turn, offset
government efforts to lure the rebel soldiers away.99
To test their hypotheses, Regan and Norton conduct logit analysis on a number of
variables including discrimination, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and access to extractable
resources. Respectively, the data is derived from various sources: the Minorities Against Risk
scale to measure discrimination, Sambanis‟s data on fractionalization, and various data from the
Diamond Registry, the National Gemstone Association, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
to determine rebels access to extractable resources.
Although much of the current debate suggests that access to resources facilitates the
mobilization process, the data revealed that extractable resources (using diamonds, gemstones,
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and opiates) has no relationship with the onset of protest or rebellion.100 In fact, access to these
resources may actually decrease the probability of civil war onset.
Disappointedly, Regan and Norton do not expound on why natural resources may
decrease the likelihood of the civil war onset. Perhaps the reason why there is no relationship
between the two is because of the lack of access rebel leaders have to the resources. Another
reason could be because diamonds and gemstones are usually mined in industrialized states, and
rebellion tends to occur more in underdeveloped states.
Shifting the discussion to the correlation between government repression and civil war,
lagging levels of political repression is generally a strong predicator of the level of civil unrest.
Regan and Norton used the Political Terror scale to determine whether there is a correlation
between civil unrest and governmental repression.101
The results indicate that when a country is highly autocratic, there is a considerably lower
probability of violent rebellion.102 Contrarily, when the political institutions allow some forms of
popular participation, the likelihood of rebellion increases.103
According to these results, if a state engages in high levels of political repression, then
the likelihood of nonviolent protests decreases significantly, whereas if a state does not repress,
protests will increase significantly. Yet, results also suggest that highly repressive states have a
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far greater probability of experiencing a civil war. This seems counterintuitive because it does
not follow the main argument that grievance-based issues are at the core of the process that
leads to civil conflict.
For example, if rebel leaders use state resources to incentivize participants of the protest,
the rebellion will likely continue and turn violent in the attempt to further the goals of the
rebellion. Citizens in highly repressive states, arguably, have more grievance-based issues than
those in low repressive states; therefore, it would seem that highly repressive states would have
more civil wars than low repressive states.
Although Regan and Norton briefly state the results of the data, they do not expound of
the reasons why the results undercut their main thesis. Being experts in the field of political
science, it would have been helpful to understand the logic, or at least theories, as to why the
results rebut their main argument.
One way in which a rebellion or protest will cease is if the rebel leaders are not able to
use state resources to pay the soldiers‟ for their labor. Regan and Norton focus on precious
stones and illegal opiates, as discussed above, since the two are easily extractable, localized, and
highly valuable.104 However, precious stones are often mined in industrialized countries that, in
general, experience less rebellion than others. Therefore, focusing on resources such as oil, coal,
and other fossil fuels could have led to different results that could refine our understanding of the
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correlation between extractable resources and civil war onset.
Regan and Norton also found that ethnolinguistic heterogeneity significantly increased
the likelihood of both rebellion and civil war, whereas more homogeneous states are less likely
to experience rebellion.105 Although the scholars do not explain this relationship in detail, it
seems to be consistent with reasoning the offered by Sambanis and Ellington, discussed earlier in
the chapter.
There is ample literature on the correlation between ethnic fractionalization and
civil war onset, and it is perhaps the most debated cause of civil war. Contrary to Regan and
Norton, Fearon and Laitin completely disregard the argument that a greater degree of ethnic or
religious diversity makes a country more prone to civil war.106 Rather, it is conditions such as
poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations that make civil war more likely
to occur.107
To test their theory, Fearon and Laitin gathered data for 161 countries, all of which had a
population of at least half a million in 1990, for the years 1945 to 1999.108 Data were gathered
from the commonly used Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, the CIA Factbook, and Grimes
and Grimes‟s data on languages spoken within a country‟s population.109
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The results indicated that ethnic and religious fractionalization as cause of civil war were
statistically insignificant when using the Ethnolinguistic fractionalozation index and the CIA
Factbook. Even when using the Grimes and Grimes data that measured the proportion of the
largest ethnic group and the log of the number of languages spoken by at least one percent were
equally insignificant.110 The ethnic diversity measures do show a strong relationship with civil
war onset, however, this relationship ceases when income is controlled for.
Fearon and Laitin also found little evidence that a civil war will break out where political
grievances are strongest. If this were so, then political democracies and states that observe civil
liberties would be not be expected to experience civil war, whereas dictatorships would.
Furthermore, states that discriminate against minority religions or languages would be
more likely to experience civil war. However, when comparing states exhibiting these
characteristics to per capita income, the data does not reflect these expectations.111
Civil violence is explained by neither ethnic nor religious grievances, but rather
conditions that favor insurgency.112 Insurgency is defined as technology or military conflict that
is characterized by small armed participants that conduct guerilla warfare from rural based areas.
Governments that are weak are attractive for insurgencies, and there is often a propensity for
brutal and indiscriminate retaliation that helps drive rebel forces.113
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Although grievances may motivate rebels, it is unlikely that factors of grievances will be
the sole cause of civil war. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin completely refute the commodity
exports fueling civil war argument, offered by Collier and Hoeffler, by finding no significance
from the data exemplifying the relationship between exports and civil war.114
Interestingly, mountainous terrain is significantly related to civil war onset. For example,
countries that are half “mountainous” have a 13.2 percent chance of civil war occurring, whereas
the chances of civil war occurring is cut into half for countries that are not mountainous.115 The
logic behind these results is that insurgency is favored by rough terrain because the rebels have
local knowledge of the population and geography of the country.116 By knowing the landscape
of the country thoroughly, rebels are able to hide from superior government forces.
Per capita income is also strongly significant in that $1,000 less in income is associated
with 41 percent greater annual odds of civil war onset.117 Even within the poorest regions (such
as former colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) those countries that estimate $1,000 or
less in income corresponds to a 34 percent chance of civil war breaking out.118
Although the overall study is a valid contribution to the literature, Fearon and Laitin
prematurely dismiss the effect that ethnic fractionalization has on civil war onset. For example,
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they argue that conditions favoring insurgency, such as state weakness marked by poverty, a
large population, and instability are better predicators of civil war onset, as opposed to
grievances such as economic inequality, ethnic, and linguistic fractionalization.119
However, decolonization is argued to be the cause of the robustness of civil wars during
the twentieth century, given that states became abruptly financially burdened and militarily
weak.120 Because a state is poor and has a weak government and military does not in and of
itself make it more conducive to civil war. There has to be some underlying reason why citizens
would rebel against their government. Of course, a country that has rough terrain may make it
easier for citizens to rebel, but it is not the reason that they rebel in the first place. In fact, deeply
rooted ethnic hatred that has been suppressed by colonization then unleashed during
decolonization would be a better explanation for civil war onset as opposed to state weakness or
poverty.
Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin have argued that countries with a lower per capita income
are more likely to experience civil war. However, there is no reason or justification given for
this argument. In countries that have a large ethnic majority and several minorities may
experience high income inequality, whereby the minorities rebel due to grievances. The findings
offered by Fearon and Laitin are interesting nonetheless, but it would give more credibility
to the study if theories were offered that justified the results from the data.
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Another study regarding the effect of ethnic division on civil war was conducted by
Marta Reynal-Querol.121 In contrast to Collier and Hoeffler, it is not the economic factors that
are more conducive to civil war. Instead, the factors gear more towards ethnic and religious
characteristics.122 Rather than restricting the study only to ethnic heterogeneity as many
scholars have done, Reynal-Querol analyzes the effect that religious polarization and animist
diversity have on the incidence of ethnic civil war.123
Using the Barro‟s data set, which is derived from the World Christian Encyclopedia,
Reynal-Querol gives special importance to the religious dimensions of ethnicity.124 The results
indicated a positive and significant effect of animist diversity on the onset of ethnic civil war.125
Even when including religious polarization and animist diversity together, the results are still
positive and statistically significant.126
Furthermore, religious polarization was found to be more important as a social cleavage
that can develop into civil war, more so than linguistic differences.127 These important religious
differences are a strong predicator for explaining domestic conflict.
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Perhaps the reason why scholars are finding such different results when controlling for
ethnic fractionalization is because each researcher uses a different definition of “ethnicity.” For
example, Fearon and Laitin define an ethnic group as, “a group larger than a family for which
membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous, and has a
conventionally recognized „natural history‟ as a group.”128
Marta Reynal-Querol defines ethnicity as a combination of language, religion, and color,
whereby the tensions caused by linguistic differences and the loss of communication that they
generate can emerge in a situation very different from those generated by religion.129 These
linguistic and religious differences causes splits within societies, and form the basis of
identifying with a particular ethnic group.
Other scholars, such as Sambanis and Regan and Norton, rely on Horowitz‟s definition of
ethnicity. Horowitz defines “ethnicity” as “being based on a myth of collective ancestry, which
usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted,
and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.”130
These different definitions of “ethnicity” are likely to result in different categorizations of
ethnic groups, as the criteria will be different for each researcher. Scholars studying the causes of
civil war should use the same operationalization of “ethnicity” so that there is more cohesion for
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this particular argument within the literature.
Turning away from the ethnic, economic and political repression grievances, other
scholars have focused on regime type as an indicator of civil war onset. Hegre et al. argue that
domestic violence is associated with political change and contrary to what has been argued in the
literature thus far, intermediate regimes are actually most prone to civil war.131
By conducting an empirical analysis that uses data from 152 countries from the years
1816 to 1992, Hegre et al. explore the direction and magnitude of political change.132
Generally, well-established democracies and autocracies have a lower hazard of civil war than
intermediate regimes.133 Countries experiencing political change are also conducive to civil war
because the central government is seen as vulnerable, thus giving rebels an opportunity to come
to power.
The researchers also used the Correlates of War data to contract their dependent variable,
Polity IV for one of their independent variables (regime change), and various other data
resources for the control variables.134 The data revealed that regimes that score in the middle
range on the democracy-autocracy index have a significantly higher probability of civil war than
either fully developed democracies or autocracies.135 Additionally, regime change strongly
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increases the probability of civil war.136 These results offer an interesting question as to whether
democratization facilitates civil war; however, this issue exceeds the scope of this thesis and,
therefore, will not be addressed.
Overall, Hegre et al. offer an interesting analysis on the relationship between
regime type and civil war onset. To have a better understanding of the contemporary effect that
regime type and regime change have on likelihood of civil, perhaps Hegre et al. should have only
included civil wars that occurred after the end of WWII. The causes of civil war were much
different in 1816 than they are in more recent years due to the advancement of technology.
Therefore, including those that occurred 200 years ago may not provide the most accurate
information for contemporaneous purposes.
Additionally, Hegre et al. did not give any reason as to why an intermediate regime
would be more conducive to civil war onset. The researchers cited several scholars that have
offered their own theories on why regime change affects the likelihood of civil war, but do not
take a formal position or offer any theories of their own. Perhaps citizens may feel more
aggrieved from transforming from an autocracy to democracy, or vice versa, therefore they rebel
against the government to promote their own ideological views.
Another theory may be that the rebels regard the government as being unstable due to the
fact that it does not have a coherent regime type, given that the government is neither fully
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democratic nor autocratic. Either the grievance based or opportunistic based theory may be a
reason why rebels would violently resist their government.
In general, grievance-based motives of civil war onset, such as ethnic and religious
fractionalization, and democratic and autocratic regimes, have received inconsistent support
within the existing literature.137 There is little consensus as to whether grievances are the direct
cause of civil war partly because the evidence is at odds with such a large body of theoretical
literature that focuses on greed-based motives because of the economic disparity among citizens
in poverty-stricken regions.138
Bodea and Elbadawi attempt to clear up the muddiness of the numerous arguments
relevant to economic and regime type conduciveness to civil war onset. They do so by
conducting a study that incorporates all of the variables tested by the notable scholars while
providing a concise literature review that compacts exactly who said what. Given the
overwhelming literature on civil war and contradictory theories, such a compacted study is
helpful for new researchers.
To start, Bodea and Elbadawi argue that the combination of low income and low
standards of democracy are likely to be associated with high probability of violence, regardless
of social characteristics within a society. High income reduces the risk of civil war because
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richer countries have a greater capacity to react to emerging rebellions. Additionally, in wealthier
countries the opportunity costs of rebellion are larger.139

This is similar to the economic

argument presented by Collier and Hoeffler.
The researchers also investigate the role that social fractionalization and regime type have
on the onset of political violence.140 Referring to the Polity IV data set, full autocracies involve
repressed political participation with no official elections; partial autocracies involve either a
small degree of competitive political participation or elections for the executive; and partial
democracies have a higher degree of political participation and elections.141 Interestingly,
interregnum periods and transition periods were characterized by either the collapse of the state
or reciprocity between characteristics of the new and old regimes.142
Similar to Regan and Norton, Bodea and Elbadawi found that extractable resources,
notably diamonds, gemstones, and opiates, were statistically insignificant.143 Even when
including oil exports, the results were still insignificant. In contrast to what Fearon and Laitin
argued, the presence of mountainous terrain was did not affect the likelihood of civil war.
Bodea and Elbadawi found that richer countries do experience less violent contestation of
political unrest, while countries with a higher per capita displayed a lower chance of
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experiencing civil war.144 While Fearon and Laitin found that anocracies are more prone to civil
war than autocracies and democracies since they are weak and incoherent regimes, Bodea and
Elbadawi found that democracies are less likely than autocracies to experience civil war.145 In
fact, the researchers did not find all anocracies to be weak political regimes because they have
the ability to contain all types of conflict.146
The problem with anocracies as being prone to civil war is not because they are an
unstable mix of democratic and autocratic features, as Fearon and Laitin assert, but the problem
is that they have both institutional openness and political participation channeled through
networks rooted in traditional identities.147 Furthermore, the countries that were most vulnerable
to conflict are partial democracies, given that they are open to recruitment of leaders and political
participation faces a large risk of conflict.148
Fearon and Laitin‟s measures were used to capture the degree of ethnic, religious, and
linguistic fractionalization in societies, in addition to Reynal-Querol‟s polarization measures to
test the effect of social diversity.149 As hypothesized, all three types of fractionalization increase
the risk of civil war.150
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Specifically, ethnic fractionalization remains statistically significant when religious and
linguistic fractionalization are included. Contrary to Reynal-Querol‟s findings, all three aspects
of polarization are insignificant, which supports the hypothesis that there is a monotonic
relationship between ethnicity, religion, languages, and civil war.151
The reason that ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization are so prone to civil war
is because existing lines of identity and contestation will provide motivational and informational
advantage to potential rebel leaders to grow a rebel organization.152 However, fractionalization
is not likely to affect lower levels of violence, such as coups or riots, because they require other
types of organizational advantages such as insider police and military information. Thus, that is
why lower levels of violence tend to be more sporadic and lack cohesive organization.153
To sum, this model provides an excellent theory for grievance factors, particularly social
fractionalization and democracy, as strong determinants for civil war.154 This theory suggests
that both grievances, in addition to economic factors, are relevant in the analysis of political
violence, and the failure of the civil war literature to account for these findings will only stagnate
the progression of understanding the causes of civil war.
To conclude this portion of the literature review, there has been ample empirical research
conducted particularly over the last twenty years regarding the causes of civil war, yet there is
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little consensus among scholars. There have been a modicum of studies conducted on the
relationship between foreign military intervention and civil war onset, by which the latter is a
consequence of the former. However, no study has categorized interventions by type.
Therefore, it is the goal of this thesis to contribute to literature on civil war by
determining whether foreign military intervention facilitates civil war onset. If the data reveal
that there is causal relationship, then determining which purposes of intervention are most
conducive to civil war onset will be important in the further understanding of the causes of civil
war onset.

Types of Foreign Military Interventions
Why countries intervene militarily into the internal affairs of another is a difficult
question to answer, which may explain why comparatively few political scientists have
attempted to answer it. Perhaps the lack of explanation is because each intervention is unique
and circumstantial. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize “intervention” itself. Nevertheless,
there have been researchers who have attempted to tackle this complex topic. Although the
studies have tended to be either case specific or relating to the morality of intervention, neither
of which are of any interest in this thesis.
Before discussing the different types of international interventions analyzed in this thesis,
there needs be a distinction made between “invasion” and “intervention.” An invasion is a
military offensive in which combatants from one geopolitical entity aggressively enters territory
52

controlled by a sovereign nation.155 Combatants generally invade a nation with the objective of
conquering, liberating, or establishing either control or authority over a territory. 156
Consequently, the government of the sovereign nation may be forced to partition part of the
country, or it may be forced to relinquish the sovereignty of the country altogether.
An invasion can be a cause of war, it can be a part of a larger strategy to end a war, or it
can result in an interstate war, should the target country choose to defend its land. Invasions are
typically strategic in both planning and execution.157
In this thesis, I define “foreign military intervention” as: “the movement of troops or
military forces by one independent country, or a group of countries in concert, across the border
of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or actions by troops
already stationed in the target state.”158
Thus, an invasion tends to be hostile and self-interested for the intervening country in its
nature. By contrast, an intervention is a broader term, and can include many different types of
motivations for conducting the intervention. Therefore, I will refer to interventions throughout
this study, rather than defining them as “invasions.”
This thesis focuses on nine types of interventions, the first which occurs when an
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intervener intervenes for the purpose of taking sides in a domestic dispute The second type of
intervention occurs when the intervener attempts to affect domestic policies. The third type of
intervention is motivated by protecting a socio-ethnic faction or minority of the target country.
Fourth, a country may decide to intervene in a sovereign country for the purpose of pursuing a
Rebel or terrorist forces that happens to be crossing the border of the sovereign country.
A country may also decide to intervene for the purpose of protecting economic or
resource interests of self or allies. The most common intervention that occurred in between 1980
and 2000 in The Middle East and North African regions was the strategic intervention with the
goal of stability, regional power balances, or pursuing ideological goals. The seventh type of
intervention is humanitarian with goal of saving civilians. This type is particularly common in
the 21st century. The eighth type of intervention occurs when a country is attempting to acquire
or retain territory that is in danger of being deprived from the intervener.
Finally, a country often intervenes for the purpose of protecting military property or
diplomatic interests. Any other purpose not mentioned above, even if related to foreign military
intervention, exceeds the scope of this thesis and will, therefore, not be discussed.
In regards to the first type of intervention, Pearson argues that there are four reasons why
a country may intervene into a domestic dispute of another country. First, the domestic conflict
in the target state might be of interest to the leader of the intervener state, and result in troops
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being dispatched into the target state.159 Second, domestic conflict may exist in the intervener
state and the leader may seek external conflict diversions by sending troops into the target
state.160
Third, as a consequence of forces independently moving into the target state and causing
conflict or disruption, the intervener might be obligated to send in reinforcements. Fourth, if
troops in the target country become embroiled in long foreign commitments, the home-front
population may grow disunified and rebel. The intervener may dispatch troops to assist either
the central government or rebels.161
Pearson compared data on foreign military interventions from 1960 to 1967, in addition
to domestic conflict during the same period.162 The results indicated that domestic conflicts were
not sufficient conditions for outside foreign military intervention; however, countries with ample
domestic conflict were far more likely to be intervened in than those that did not experience
conflict.163
A large body of literature focuses on third-party interventions in a particular type of
domestic dispute, civil wars, whereby the intervener dispatches troops to reinforce either the
central government or the rebels. An intervener‟s choice to intervene in a civil war depends on
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whether the intervention will allow the goal to be achieved in a short period of time with
minimal costs.164 Decisions to intervene in a civil war are also affected by dynamic processes
within the target state, rather than on fixed country characteristics.165
Interventions in civil wars, regardless of which side the intervener supports, influences
the course and nature of the warfare in civil wars.166 Foreign assistance by means of intervention
alters the balance of military capabilities between the two sides, which, in turn, is responsible for
altering the form of warfare that emerges within a particular time and place during the civil
war.167
Similar to the first type of intervention, states may also choose to intervene in an attempt
to affect domestic policies of the target state. For example, when a central government is absent
or dysfunctional, a state may attempt to affect domestic policies by intervening with the goal of
reconstruction.168 Foreign governments often assume that it can intervene in a state that has
either a fragile of failed government by reconstructing the state most favorable to the
intervener.169
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However, this assumption often overlooks the possibility of either the intervention failing
or implementing a regime change that will result in rebellion by the citizens; thus, sparking civil
unrest. This misdiagnoses has led to interventions that have created ineffective policies and
perverse outcomes.170
States may also intervene for the purpose of protecting a socio-ethnic faction or a
minority group. Fox (2001) suggests that a state will intervene into another to protect an
ethnic minority due to having a similar religious affiliation with the citizens of the target state.
The ethnic affinity one government has for the citizens of another state is due to emotional ties
created by shared ethnic identity that can create a feeling of responsibility for oppressed citizens
of the same ethnicity living elsewhere.171
Furthermore, the majority of foreign interveners have a similar religion to those
minorities on whose behalf they intervene.172 Interestingly, religious conflicts that involve
Christian or Muslim minorities have attracted foreign military intervention approximately ten
times as often as conflict involving other religious minorities.173 These findings strongly indicate
that religion is an important influence on the decision to intervene for the purpose of protecting
socio-ethnic factions.174
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Perhaps another reason why a country intervenes in another for the purpose of protecting
an ethnic faction or minority is because the international community has a “responsibility to
protect.”175 Under this doctrine, the Genocide Convention has set the precedent for a moral
obligation that has driven the world to continue the evolution of universalistic agreements, in
addition to the encouragement of government to protect all persons from harm.176
In turn, the International Criminal Court has been established to hold persons and
governments accountable that do not uphold this morality standard. Therefore, every
government in the international community has a moral obligation to intervene in a country
should any citizens need protection. More often than not, it is either an ethnic faction or a
minority group that needs protection.
A country may intervene in another if the intervening government is actively pursuing a
specific group of rebels or terrorists. Azam and Thelen found that the United States, in
particular, have intervened in various countries militarily, motivated by pursuing terrorists as
opposed to having a geo-strategic interests.177 In fact, a deployment of U.S. troops reduces the
number of terrorist attacks coming from the target country.178
In the same vein, Sheehan collected transnational terrorism data from 1993 through 2004
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and found that the number of United States foreign military interventions had substantially
increased in the last twenty years due to the “Global War on Terror.”179 In the unfortunate
event that a country is a haven for terrorists or is host to a rebellion group being pursued are
conditions conducive for foreign military intervention.180 Military interventions tend to be more
hostile if an intervener intervenes for the purpose of attacking terrorists that are being harbored
by the target government.181
Economic or resource interests are another reason why a country might intervene in
another. Albosnoz insists that foreign military intervention is most likely to originate from
countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias, in addition to destinations
where foreign direct investment is highly profitable.182 Absent a motive to protect foreign direct
investment, a government is unlikely to intervene.183
However, middle and small powers are unlikely to be in a position to intervene to protect
economic interests because most of their economic ties are to large powers.184 Contrarily, great
powers are much more likely than small and middle powers to intervene in an effort to protect
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economic interests.185
A government‟s interest in another‟s natural resources can also be a motive for military
intervention. For example, dependence on oil for energy, the necessity of water for its citizens,
and the lucrative nature of diamonds or gems can be a reason why a country would intervene in
another.186 By intervening and confiscating the valuable resources, the intervener has the
potential to generate both wealth and political power.187
However, the consequence of intervening for economic or resource interest could make
civil war more likely to occur because the intervener may be perceived as an economic
imperialist.188 As a result, the intervention may provoke violent retaliation or may fuel
instability that causes citizens to rebel against their government since it would be seen as weak
for allowing the intervention to occur.
Countries have been intervening in sovereign nations for the purpose of strategically
pursuing ideological goals since the recognition of nation-states. A relatively more recent
phenomenon, however, is intervening strictly for the purpose of democratizing a country. If a
democratic country were to intervene in a non-democratic country, democracy can have a
positive impact on the target state if the intervener were to promote free and fair elections during
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its intervention.189
Perhaps an even more recent phenomenon, nuclear arms, is another reason why countries
may or may not intervene in others. Tillema argues that since overt military intervention is the
most grievous form of punishment, obtaining nuclear weapons may prevent foreigners from
invading and, thus, serves as a deterrent.190 Therefore, if a country has a nuclear weapon, it is
less likely to be intervened.
The theory of “nuclear paralysis” suggests that military forces have lost much of its
traditional utility for great powers in the nuclear age due to their fear that armed conflict may
expand to nuclear war, resulting in catastrophe for everyone.191 Those countries that do not have
nuclear weapons are particularly vulnerable, and great powers may intervene at leisure given that
they generally have the resources to do so.
Humanitarian intervention is perhaps the most commonly discussed type of intervention
within the literature. Intervening for humanitarian purposes is justified by implementation of the
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, which is enforced by the United Nations. The doctrine
suggests that sovereignty is not an absolute right, and states forfeit aspects of their sovereignty
when they fail to protect their citizens from crimes of atrocity.192 Such crimes include genocide,
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crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.193
A country may also intervene for the purpose of either acquiring or retaining territory.
Pearson suggests that an intervention could occur whereby the intervener may use fear of
contagion as an excuse to justify the intervention in order to conceal the real interest, which is
taking territory while the target state is preoccupied in a domestic dispute.194 Clashes in disputed
territories may also facilitate foreign military interventions.195
No surprisingly, interventions for the purpose of acquiring territory are most likely to
occur within 3,000 miles of the intervener‟s capital.196 Neighboring states that tend to be
unstable by nature are more vulnerable to intervention. Furthermore, interventions against the
target state reduce the government‟s ability to maintain full control over the entire national
territory due to its coercive and administrative capacity being diminished by the intervention.197
This gives the intervening country not only an advantage in acquire the targeting
country‟s territory, but also an incentive to do so. Consequently, the target state‟s inability to
maintain control may provide opportunities for rebel groups to have greater access to state
resources and other essential materials.198 The instability caused by the intervention could create
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conditions that are conducive for civil war onset.
Finally, a county might intervene in the target state to protect diplomatic or military
interest, such as military bases, embassies, or diplomats.199 In rare circumstances, though it has
occurred, a government may relocate bases into the country that the government is planning on
invading so as to use the protection of the base as an excuse for invading.200 It is more common,
however, for a government to invade a country in an effort to protect military bases that were
already physically present in the target country.

Consequences of Foreign Military Interventions
The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ushered in a new basis for the modern
international system of independent states. Under the treaty, the principle of sovereignty of
nation-states was recognized, in addition to the agreement of non-intervention of one state in the
internal affairs of other state.201 Despite this fundamental agreement among the international
community, however, foreign intervention has become quite prevalent in the Post-WWII world.
The second strand of scholarship in this chapter discusses the general consequences that
foreign military intervention has on the target state. Surprisingly, there has been little work done

199

Pearson, “Foreign Military Intervention and Domestic Disputes,” 262.

200

Stuart Douglas, “Reflections on State Intervention and the Schmidtsdrift Bushmen.” Journal of Contemporary

African Studies 15, no. 1 (1997), 49.
201

Stephen Okhonmina, “States Without Borders: Westphalia Territoriality Under Threat.” Journal of Social

Science 24, no. 3 (2010), 177.

63

on the impact that foreign interventions have on the countries that are intervened. Consequently,
the field of international affairs has little understanding of the impacts that military interventions
can have on the target states.202
Concluding the section will include the justification as to why certain types of
international military interventions matter more than others. For example, some types of
interventions, such as those that aim to take sides in a domestic dispute or acquire territory of the
target country, have negative consequences on the target country. Meanwhile, other types of
interventions, namely those that are conducted for humanitarian purposes, generally have a
neutral effect on the target country.
Pickering and Kisangani collected data on military ventures for 106 underdeveloped
countries from 1960 to 2002 and found that large scale military interventions do not have a
significant impact on governing institutions, the target state‟s economy, or the target citizens‟
physical quality of life. Contrarily, hostile interventions into non-democratic states can decrease
economic growth in addition to negatively impacting governing institutions.203
The reason why there is so much difficulty in determining what, if any, consequences are
by intervening into a sovereign state is twofold. First, there is a tremendous number of factors
that need to be considered in order to predict the consequences, such as: the purpose of the
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intervention, whether the intervener was a rival or friend of the target state, the amount of troops
dispatched, the types of weapons, if any, that are used, the duration of the intervention, and the
conditions of the targeting country. There are several other factors that must be considered; the
ones listed are simply those that are fundamental to determining the extent of the consequences
of the intervention.
The second reason why it is difficult to determine the consequences is because
“intervention” cannot be generalized since every foreign military intervention is unique.
Determining the consequences of an intervention must be analyzed on a case by case basis, given
the uniqueness of every intervention. For example, there is no country that has the same ethnic
fractionalization, GDP, or population size as another. Therefore, it would not be possible to
explain the consequence that every intervention will have on a target state since no two are
exactly alike.
What can be determined, however, is whether external interveners intend to spark civil
conflict by intervening in the target state. Generally, if civil war should follow an intervention, it
is an unintended consequence of the interveners. Although the intervening country may create
conditions that are conducive to civil war onset, it is unlikely that it is intentional.
Depending on the purpose of the intervention, citizens may welcome, be neutral, or
may resist the intervention. How the central government and target state‟s citizens‟ react to the
intervention could also be a strong indicator in determining whether civil conflict will ensue.
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For example, if a country intervenes for the strategic purpose of democratizing the target state,
and provides foreign aid and military assistance that keeps the target county‟s government in
power, there is a low probability that internal conflict will occur.204 By contrast, if a neighboring
state takes advantage of the target state‟s weak government or military, and intervenes with the
purpose of acquiring territory, there is a high probability that internal conflict will ensue the
intervention.205
In the former scenario, the citizens‟ of the target state would likely benefit from the
excess of foreign aid given by the intervener. Thus, such interventions would likely be
welcomed and the intervener should not expect resistance. However, in the latter scenario, it is
unlikely that the citizens in the target country would welcome such intervention given that their
land is being taken from them by a foreign presence. Thus, internal conflict would be expected.
The reason why some international military interventions matter more than others is
attributed to the consequences that are expected to follow.206 For example, if the unintended
consequence of internal conflict within the target country ensues the intervention, then the
capacity for extremist groups, the targeting of minorities, and in some cases even genocide,
could occur.207 If a government had knowledge of such consequences prior to conducting the
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intervention, the intervener may have decided against it, given the hindrance of genocide on a
systemic level.
International military interventions may be direct and hostile in nature, or they may be a
more indirect and mild in their methods.208 Hostile interventions may reduce the target regime‟s
ability to maintain full control over the entire national territory by diminishing its coercive and
administrative capacity.209 Consequently, safe haven possibilities may arise for neighboring
rival groups and facilitate the transnational spread of arms and other illicit activities that increase
the risk of civil conflict in surrounding countries.210
By contrast, supportive interventions, such as those for humanitarian purposes, are likely
to bolster the coercive capacity and enhance the military capacity of the regime.211 In turn, the
balance of power will shift in favor of the target leadership over key rival groups. Interventions
that occur in countries with a collapsed government and civil society are generally neutral in
their nature.212 Because of the instability that already exists within the target state, such
interventions have a neutral effect on the target state.
An international military intervention does not always precipitate negative consequences;
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rather, it may actually prevent a war from occurring. An intervention for the purpose of taking
sides in a domestic dispute could be used as leverage to bolster a particular party‟s position,
which would force the weaker side to hold out in a prolonged struggle.213 In turn, the weaker side
would likely surrender, given that the adversary has foreign reinforcement at its avail should the
conflict escalate.
Knowing the particular type of intervention could assist government leaders in being able
to predict the consequences of the intervention, regardless of whether it will have a positive or
negative effect on the target state. Therefore, categorizing the types of interventions, as opposed
to simply generalizing all types as “intervention,” could be useful by avoiding unfavorable
consequences.

213

Steve Chan, “Loss Aversion and Strategic Opportunism: Third-Party Intervention‟s Role in War Instigation By

the Weak.” Peace and Change 37, no. 2 (2012), 181.

68

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL INTUITION

While the previous chapter discussed the causes of civil war, this chapter discusses
explanations for the causes of civil war theoretically. To do that, political scientists have
proposed three theories to help explain why civil wars occur: the primordialist view of civil
conflict, the rationalist explanation, and the relative deprivation theory.
The latter two are aligned with the greed vs. grievance theories discussed briefly in the
previous chapter. The primordialist view is introduced in this chapter and the rationalist and
relative deprivation theories are expounded on because all the three competing theories are the
underlying theme of civil war.
The primordialist view focuses on explaining ethnic civil war, whereby ethnicity is an
exceptionally strong affiliation that is rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past
atrocities that make violence difficult to avoid.214 Within an ethnic group, people identify with
one another by being bound together through a common heritage that is either real or presumed
to be real.215 Being a part of an ethnic group satisfies an individual primal need to belong to a
group in an anarchic “Hobbesian” world.216
Furthermore, primordialist argue that the deep and long standing differences between
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ethnic groups causes conflicts in societies that are ethnically diverse.217 Because of the deep
cultural, biological and psychological nature of ethnic cleavages, conflict is rooted in intense
emotional reactions and feelings of mutual threat.218 Therefore, when an ethnic groups is
threatened in any way or an event occurs that sparks resemblance of a negative historical event,
the ethnic group will resort to violence.
There are two stands of thought within the rationalist explanation for causes of civil war.
The first is analogous to the “greed” argument presented by Collier and Hoeffler, whereby rebels
are modeled as rent-seeking entrepreneurs who are driven more by greed than as victims of
either discrimination or victims of a repressive state.219 The second strand is offered by Fearon
and Laitin, who focus on indicators of state strength as an explanation of rebellion.220
The rational explanation of civil war emphasizes the economic motivations for conflict,
void of any psychological or sociological factors. Their economic model assumes that potential
recruits make a rational decision to join the rebellion, in which their decision is based on a costbenefit analysis.221
However, rather than the recruits themselves making the decision to join the rebellion,
many rebel armies use coercion in their recruitment process.222 Threats and punishments can be
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used as selective incentives, whereby it is rational for the rebel leader to use force rather than
reward to solve the lack of membership problem.223 Such incentives include wages,
opportunities to loot, promises of reward after the conflict is over, or physical protection from
the opposing side.224
The second strand of rationalist explanations is expounded on by Fearon and Laitin.
They posit that civil war is likely to occur in states with conditions conducive to rebel
organization, such as economic growth, low income per capita, or mountainous terrain.225 These
conditions will either decrease the rebellion‟s opportunity cost or decrease the capacity of the
state, which will result in the mobilization of an insurgent movement.
Fearon suggests three mechanisms which are compatible with rationalist explanations for
civil war. All three are directed towards bargaining failure that results in civil war. Firstly,
asymmetric information regarding the strength of the rebellion results in opponents not knowing
their relative military capability.226 For example, if one party is overly optimistic of the chances
of success, there may be no peaceful outcome by which both parties recognize as mutually
beneficial. 227 Therefore, either side may believe to be stronger than the other due to asymmetric
information, and has no reason to refrain from engaging in violence.
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The second reason for bargaining failure is attributed to the inability of states to arrange a
settlement due to commitment problems. Mutually preferable bargains are unattainable because
one or more states would have an incentive to renege on the terms.228 In other words, neither
side is able to come to an agreement to prevent war because the government is likely to renege
on the settlement in the aftermath of the war. Therefore, a settlement is not attainable given the
inability for either side to fully commit to the terms set forth during negotiations.
The third rationalist explanation offered by Fearon is less compelling than the first two,
but is still a possible explanation as to why civil war occurs. States might be unable to attain a
peaceful settlement that both parties agree on due to issue indivisibilities.229 Thus, there are
some issues that are so important to either side that compromise is not feasible. Some examples
include places of special religious or cultural significance, or whether abortion should be both
legal and morally acceptable in a particular state.230
Finally, relative deprivation theories argue that civil wars occur when a particular group
within the state becomes sufficiently aggrieved and begin mobilizing for political change. This
argument is aligned with the grievance-based theories discussed in the previous chapter.
Because of the inequality between either the state and its citizens or between citizens
within the state, persons begin rebelling due to frustration.231 Frustration does not necessarily
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lead to violence, but when it is prolonged and sharply felt, anger results and civil war eventually
breaks out. Just as frustration produces aggressive behavior on the part of the individual, relative
deprivation produces collective violence by social groups.232
Relative deprivation does not only include income inequality, but also social conditions
such as political rights or civil liberties. Feelings of relative deprivation arise when desires
become legitimate expectations, yet the desires are blocked by society.
Many scholars have extended Gurr‟s work by focusing on the roles of democratic and
authoritarian regimes in providing adequate social conditions by which citizens are able to
express discontent peacefully. Hegre, in particular, argues that lack of political rights is a strong
factor for the onset of civil war.233 Since there has been an increase in political rights granted to
citizens in the last two centuries, those citizens whom are still deprived of political rights may
begin to grow frustrated. As this sense of unfairness and frustration spreads among communities,
persons begin to collectively rebel.
An assertion in the relative deprivation theory is that social and temporal comparisons are
an essential component in assessing whether one is deprived. Both of these comparisons can be
subsumed within the process of counterfactual comparisons between an individual‟s current
outcomes and the outcomes that might have been.234
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Counterfactual comparisons involve mental simulations, wherein individuals imagine
what their outcome might have been if circumstances had been different.235 Once individuals
begin sharing their feelings or imagery thoughts to others, collective actions beings and those
that feel deprived seek what they are deprived of through violent means.
Given that I am analyzing the relationship between foreign military intervention and civil
war onset, it is doubtful that primordialist theory will be able to explain why civil war occurs.
With the exception of the interventions that occur for the purposes of protecting social factions
or minorities, none of the other eight types of interventions would create conditions causing civil
war that can be explained by common heritage or ethnic group identity.
In other words, if civil war onset could be explained by the primordialist theory, that
would indicate that foreign military interventions have no effect on the target country in terms of
creating civil conflict, given that it would be inevitable due to the deep rooted ethnic ties.
However, as the data has shown and is discussed in chapter 5, income inequality and regime type
do seem to be factors that are conducive to civil war onset.
The rationalist explanation appears to be the most applicable theory for the cause of civil
war, particularly Collier and Hoeffler‟s economic model. For example, countries with a higher
GDP such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco did not experience civil war; whereas countries
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with a lower GDP such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen experienced several civil wars between
the years 1980 and 2000.
Additionally, Fearon and Laitin‟s rationalist explanation could also shed light on why
civil war occurs. For example, there was economic growth in Lebanon from 1990 to 2000, while
the last civil war that occurred after 1980 was in 1989. Perhaps it was economic growth that
prevented civil wars from occurring. As a consequence of economic growth, rebels do not have
as much opportunity costs as they would if there was a lower GDP with high inequality.
Finally, it is unlikely that the reason civil wars occur can be explained by the theory of
relative deprivation. Although several of the civil wars that occurred in the sample size within
this study did have a Political Terror value of “4” or “5” (elaborated on in chapter 5), there were
several other instances where the Political Terror value was at “5,” yet no civil war occurred.
It is true that political repression does contribute to the likelihood of civil; however, the
data in this study does not reflect it being a sole reason why civil war would occur because the
R-Squared is only .04 when only civil war onset and political terror are regressed.
Furthermore, a country with a higher GDP is likely have more resources to contribute to
its citizens through assistance programs; therefore, economic inequality would not likely be
significant enough to spark a rebellion.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the methodology of this thesis. First, the unit of analysis is
discussed and justified. Next, I provide a description of the data sets that are used, in addition to
justifications for using them. I also list my hypotheses regarding the connection between the
independent or control variables and the dependent variable. Finally, I provide a detailed
explanation of the formal quantitative method that I used to test the variables‟ relationships.

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis consists of countries, all of which are in the Middle Eastern and
North African regions. My sample consists of the following 20 countries located in the Middle
East and North Africa: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen.
I did not include countries that border the Caspian Sea, namely Azerbaiijan,
Turkmanistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Tajiikistan, because there is, arguably, Russian presence
that I did not want to account for in this study. Russian presence would have to be controlled for
given that the decisions in each respective country‟s government is not entirely its own. Given
the complexity of controlling for Russian presence, the countries bordering the Caspian Sea are
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omitted from this study. Iran is the only country that does border the Caspian Sea, but I included
it in the sample because it shares a border with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; therefore, it is
presumed that internal events could affect surrounding countries.
Data were collected for each country from 1980 to 2000. I begin my data analysis in the
year 1980 because that is the year following three major events occurred in the Middle East, all
of which occurred in 1979: the Islamic Revolution erupted in Iran, consequently overthrowing
the Shah and establishing the Islamic Republic, which is still intact today. In the second event,
the Russian army invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979 in an effort to maintain the power of
the Amin government. Both the first and second events are used as case studies and are,
therefore, explored in detail in Chapter six.
Finally, Saddam Hussein formally came to power in Iraq 1979, which reinstated the
power of the Sunni Muslims and eventually worsened the tension between Sunnis and Shiites.
I selected the year 2000 as the last year I collected data was because I did not want to include
data that may be affected by the 2001 U.S. invasion into Afghanistan or the 2003 U.S. invasion
into Iraq. The presence of the U.S. affected the Polity score of both Afghanistan and Iraq, in
addition to causing a decline in the economies. Therefore, accounting for these changes in only
two of the 20 countries I analyzed would have created inconsistences within the overall results.
There are several reasons why I selected the Middle East/North Africans region for this
study. Firstly, the Middle East is one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world; therefore,
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it is an excellent starting point for researchers who seek to analyze political conflict, or in this
case, civil war onset. For example, it is host to the sixty-seven-year-old Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, which is one of the most enduring conflict to have ever occurred.236
The region has also hosted the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq, which had numerous international
participants.237 Another example is the interstate war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988,
which destabilized the region for nearly a decade and resulted in devastation for both country
participants.
The region is also near other long-term conflict zones, including the Horn of Africa, the
Caucasus, and the Sudan. Because of the internal and regional instabilities, close ties between
the Middle Eastern and arms-producing governments. Thus, only encouraging the conflict
within the region.
Perhaps this is why there are so many foreign military interventions by countries within
the Middle East. See table 2 for the quantity of interventions by regions. When unstable
countries dispatch troops to pursue military goals, the target country is generally in the same
region. The table below shows the number of foreign military interventions both before and after
the Cold War.238
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Table 2. Interventions by Region, 1946-2000
______________________________________________________________________________
Cold War (N=690)
1946-1989
________________________________
Region
Middle East
Asia
Western Europe
Sub-Sahara Africa
North America
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Oceania

Number
173
118
96
84
74
45
37
6

Percent
25.1
17.1
13.9
12.2
10.7
6.5
5.4
0.9

Per Year
3.43
2.68
2.18
1.90
1.68
1.02
.84
.13
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Pre-Cold War (N=425)
1990-2005
__________________________
Number
48
52
76
52
40
24
32
14

Percent
11.3
12.2
17.9
12.2
9.4
5.6
7.5
3.3

Per Year
3.00
3.25
4.75
3.25
2.50
1.50
2.00
0.87

As shown, the majority of military interventions that occurred before the end of the Cold
War did so in the Middle East. Although that number drops to 48 after the Cold War, it is still
a substantial number of interventions. Perhaps the number decreased because of the Gulf War or
the U.S. invasions into Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003.
Aside from the altruistic purposes of intervention, the Middle East/North African region
is attractive to foreigners who seek power. Because of the quantity of interventions that occurred
in the Middle East and North Africa, in addition to the various purposes of these interventions,
this region is ideal for this research.
Second, because of the continuous conflict in the region, first world countries, either
independently or through the United Nations, have spent decades sending troops that attempt to
calm down the contentious areas and protect civilians.
Third, the Middle East lags behind in economic, social, and political development.239
Thus, this stagnation could be reason why there is so much conflict in the region. It would be
exceedingly unproductive for researchers to use first-world countries, which have experienced
either very little or no civil wars at all, as their samples for studying causes of internal conflict.
Additionally, the Middle East is characterized by authoritarian regimes, oil-dependent
economies, and ethnic diversity, all of which have been linked to causes of civil war.240
Finally, all of the countries in the sample are dominated by Islam, which encompasses the
239

Ibid., 142.

240

Ibid.

80

continuous contention between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. There are several scholars who
are either advocates or opponents of the theory that ethnic, religious, and linguistic
fractionalization are conducive to civil war onset. Because the Middle East and North Africa are
highly fractionalized in all three respects, it is the quintessential region to test this theory.

Data
This thesis tests nine independent variables, seven control variables, and consists of one
binary dependent variable. The nine independent variables all derive from the International
Military Intervention (IMI) data set and are the types of intervention. Although the interventions
are more for a purpose or motivation for the intervention itself, I refer to them as “types” for
simplicity.
Thus, the nine types of interventions are: (1) take sides in a domestic dispute; (2) attempt
to affect domestic policies; (3) protect a socio-ethnic faction or minority of the target country; (4)
pursue a rebel terrorist forces across the border; (5) attempting to protect economic or resource
interests of self or others; (6) strategic intervention with the goal of stability, regional power
balances, or pursuing ideological goals; (7) humanitarian purposes with the goal of saving
civilians; (8) attempt to acquire or retain territory; and, (9) protect military property or
diplomatic interests.
Following the order above, I have coded these nine independent variables as follows:
domestic; policy; social, pursuit; economic; strategic; human; territorial; and, diplomatic. All of
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these variables were discussed in detail in chapter two. All nine independent variables are used
as dummy variables, with “0” indicating a foreign military intervention had not occurred, and
“1” indicating that the specific country did experience a foreign military intervention.
When creating my dataset, I listed each of the twenty countries in column A, and listed
each year from 1980 to 2000 in column B for each country. Columns C-K represents the nine
types of interventions, in which each year for each country has either a “0” or a “1.”
The IMI data set covers the period from 1946 to 2005, by which I am only collecting data
for the years 1980 to 2000. The data set includes 667 cases of military interventions that have
occurred across international boundaries by regular armed forces of independent states in the
regions of Europe, the Americas (including the Caribbean), Asia and the Pacific, Sub-Saharan
Africa, and the Middle East/North Africa.241
Note that data for the years 1946 to 1988 were first collected by Fredrick Pearson and
Robert Baumann (1993). Data from the years 1989 to 2005 were collected by Emizet F.
Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering (2008). The update of the IMI data set extended from the
original data set from 1988 and to ensure consistency across the entire 1946 to 2005 time span,
all coding and operationalizations are the same.242
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The researchers have defined military intervention operationally as “the movement of
regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country into the territory or
territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by
one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.”243 Transport of
troops, regardless of where the troops are sent from, into a fighting zone is considered
intervention.244
The data include forceful interventions, which refers to the use of troops
in some form of deterrent or forceful role; the interventions are not referring to troops reinstating
infrastructure or acting as administers for medical relief programs, even if the latter may
influence the course of battle.245
Overall, the IMI data set catalogs any purposeful dispatch of national troops into another
sovereign country, regardless of whether it is neutral, or supports or opposes the target
government.246 The reason that I used this data set, as opposed to others that consist of foreign
military interventions, is because it categorizes the motives behind the state uses of military
force. This data set is one of very few intrastate conflict data sets that have attempted to do so.247
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The researchers have used dummy variables that indicate whether troops were dispatched to
pursue the motive for each of the nine types of intervention.
Because of the increase in the occurrence of civil wars since the end of WWII, it is
becoming increasingly important to study intrastate conflict. There is already ample literature
discussing the causes of civil wars; however, there is little literature on the motivations of
countries to intervene. These data, paired with the Correlates of War data set (hereafter COW),
could assist researchers in determining whether a specific motivation of intervention would
facilitate civil war in the target country.
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) acknowledged this use when they stated: “Researchers
can focus on specific types of motivating issues to add new knowledge to our understanding of
forceful state activity, or they can group them into broader categories similar to Regan‟s (2002)
analysis of economic and military intervention into civil wars.”248
Next, I turn to the control variables. Each will be discussed separately, as there are
different data sets that must be described in detail. The first control variable is “gross domestic
product” (GDP). As it defined by the World Bank, GDP is the sum of gross value added by all
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products.249
As explained in the literature review, countries experiencing economic inequality
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(relative to other countries, not individuals) and poverty have been argued to be causes of civil
war. Collier and Hoeffler are among those who vehemently argue that factors that increase the
domestic military or financial viability of rebellion correlate with conflict; more so than factors
leading to grievances such as lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious fractionalization.250
In regards to the data, all monetary figures are in U.S. dollars and were converted from
domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. The following data were missing
from the World Bank data set: Afghanistan: 1982 to 2000; Iraq: 1980 to 2000; Iran: 1991 and
1992; Lebanon: 1980 to 1987; Libya: 1980 to 1989; and, Yemen: 1980 to 1989.
Therefore, for purposes of completeness, I gathered all data that was missing from the
Statistical Division from the United Nations. The United Nations also converted the current and
constant price series into U.S. Dollars by applying the corresponding market exchange rates as
reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is highly doubtful that the exchange rate
reported to the IMF would skew the GDP figure.251
Since STATA converts the GDP figures into scientific notation, it may be difficult to
interpret the logit regression results. Therefore, I divided each GDP figure by one million.
Consequently, the place values for the decimal numbers are represented in the tens, ones, and
tenths places. These place values are translated into trillion, billion, and million, respectively.
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The data for the second and third control variables, Polity and Democratic scores, were
derived from the Polity IV data set. Polity IV consists of data on political regime characteristics
and transitions that have been collected from the year 1800 to 2013.252 The data set itself is an
annual, cross-national time-series and polity-case format that codes democratic and autocratic
patterns of authority in all independent countries with a population greater than 500,000 in
2013.253
The Polity Score captures a country‟s regime authority, which is referring to qualities
of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. The term “Polity” itself is
defined as a “political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized
government.”254 The score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
democratic).255 To obtain the Polity score, the researchers subtracted the “autocratic” score from
the “democratic” score.
Afghanistan is the only country that is missing both Polity and Democratic scores; the
years missing are: 1980 to 1988 and 1993 to 1995. Scores are missing for 1980 to 1988 because
the government was interrupted from a foreign presence.256 Scores are missing from the years
1993 to 1995 because there was no government; the country was in anarchy.257
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The “Democratic” score was obtained by analyzing three different elements: first, “the
presence of the institutions and procedures though which citizens can express effective
preferences about alternative policies and leaders.”258 Second, the existence and extent of
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.259 Finally, the civil
liberties guaranteed by the government in addition to acts of political participation. Means of
these democratic principles also include the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, and
freedom of the press. The “Democratic” score ranges from zero to ten; the closer the score is to
zero, the less democratic a country is.
The purpose of testing these two control variables is to determine whether regime type
effects civil war onset. The majority of scholars who are mentioned in the literature review have
either been advocates or opponents of the hypothesis that the more autocratic a government is,
the more prone that country is to civil war. It will be interesting to determine whether, and to
what extent, this argument has any merit. Additionally, it will be interesting to know whether
there is any association between how democratic a county is affects the likelihood of civil war.
The ethnic fractionalization data compiled by Alberto Alesina (2003) and associates will
be used for the fourth, fifth, and sixth control variables. The data set measures the degree of
ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in various countries. It also takes into account
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racial characteristics (ethnicity) while examining the effects of ethnic fragmentation on both
economic growth and the quality of institutions and policy.260 The dataset covers 190 countries
and territories.
Alesina, et al. gathered their data from Encyclopaedia Britannica, CIA‟s World Factbook,
Levinson‟s Ethnic Groups Worldwide, Minority Rights Groups International‟s World Directory
of Minorities, and Mozaffar & Scarrit.261 A score of “1” implies a highly heterogeneous country;
whereas a score of “0” refers to a perfectly homogeneous country.262
The only problem with using Alesina‟s data is that it is not a time series data set. Rather,
the data set is cross-sectional, whereby the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization
scores are given for one specific year per country.
The only country that was missing ethnicity data was Yemen, and I supplemented the
missing score with Fearon‟s fractionalization data. I did so because he also included data on
linguistic and religious fractionalization per country. There were two other data set that I found
which used a time series for each of the three fractionalization scores; however, the data set
lacked both reliability and validity because the researchers only relied on the CIA‟s World
Factbook to obtain the data. This is problematic because relying on one source, without
comparing results to other sources, may yield inaccurate results. Therefore, Alesina‟s
260
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fractionalization data is the most credible of the three.
To account for the missing data for nineteen of the years (as only one was reported by
Alesina), I replicated each of the three fractionalization scores for all twenty years. For example,
in 1995 Afghanistan had an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.7693, a linguistic fractionalization
score of 0.6141, and a religious fractionalization score of 0.2717.
Therefore, for all of the years between 1980 to 1994, and 1996 to 2000, I used these
same scores. It is unlikely that a country‟s fractionalization would alter substantially; therefore,
this method is justified. Appendix C is of a chart that reflects each of the three fractionalization
scores that Alesina entered for the actual year, per country.
The reason I control for ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization is because
fractionalization in general, being a potential cause of civil war, is perhaps one of the most
contentious arguments within the literature. The empirical research conducted by Fearon and
Laitin (2003) have demonstrated that there is no relationship between ethnic fractionalization
and civil war onset.263 Meanwhile other scholars have reported empirical results that are
favorable to the argument of fractionalization being a strong indicator of civil war onset.264
I am also using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) to measure political repression, the
seventh control variable. The scale ranges from 1 to 5; “1” indicates no political repression and
“5” indicates severe political repression whereby no citizens have the right to promote
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ideological views; rather, only those construed by the leader are promoted.265
The following is a detailed breakdown of the description for each score: a score of “1”
reflects countries that are under a secure rule of law, whereby citizens are neither imprisoned for
their ideological views nor tortured for any purposes.266 A “2” reflects a limited amount of
imprisonment for nonviolent political activity in addition to few citizens being tortured or beaten
under exceptional circumstances.
A score of “3” indicates extensive political imprisonment whereby citizens or political
participants are executed. Additionally, government officials detain persons without trial. With
a score of “4,” a country‟s civil and political rights violations have expanded to a large number
of the population; murders, disappearances, and torture are common. Finally, a score of “5”
reflects terror that has expanded to the whole population and leaders place no limits on the means
with which they pursue their ideological goals.267
The reason I am testing both Polity IV and PTS is because Polity IV not only measures
how democratic a country is, but it also measures regime type. PTS, however, measures
repression in the context of political and civil rights violations.
Data for the PTS were collected by data from the Amnesty International and the State
Department. However, I rely on score reported by the State Department since is provides more
265
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data than Amnesty International collected. Fortunately, the researchers created the data set as a
time-series. The following are missing data from the PTS: Lebanon, from year 1980 to 1988;
Yemen, years 1985, 1986, and 1988. The researchers who gathered the PTS data did not indicate
why data were missing from Lebanon and Yemen for those particular years stated above.
The dependent variable is civil war, and I use the COW Intra-state War data set (2014).
Because of the detailed description of the operationalization of civil war that was given in
Chapter Two, I will not elaborate on criteria for determining an armed conflict is a civil war.
Similarly, because of the numerous variables involved in this data set, I will only elaborate on
the variables that are used in this study.
Generally, the COW Project is an academic study of the history of warfare and was
founded by David Singer, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. The project is
currently in its fourth version, which includes data collected from 1816 to 2010, constituting a
total of 334 intra-state wars. Although the COW Project has multiple data sets, only the
Intrastate War data set is used in this thesis. “Intrastate war” is defined as a war that
predominately takes place within the recognized territory of a state.268
Within the COW typology of war, intra-state wars have been subdivided into three
general types, which are based up on the status of the combatants: (1) civil wars that involve the
government of the state against a non-state entity; (2) regional internal wars that involve the
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government of a regional subunit against a non-state entity; and, (3) inter-communal wars that
involve combat between two or more non-state entities within the state.269 Civil wars are then
subdivided further into two types: those attempting to take control of the central government, and
those disputing local issues.270
It is important to note that intra-state wars are classified as “internationalized” when one
or more outside state intervenes in the war. The war will remain “internationalized” as long as
the intervenor does not participate in the bulk of the fighting.271 If the intervenor does take over
the bulk of the fighting, then the war will cease to be labeled as an intra-state war and it will,
thus, be transformed into a different classification. This is an important detail for this study,
since the focus is not only on intrastate wars, but also foreign military intervention. Similar to
the coding of the IMI data, the variable “civil war” is also a dummy, whereby “0” indicated no
civil war occurred and “1” indicating that one had occurred.
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and variable type for all 17 variables that are
used in this study. The purpose of the table is to compare the variables with one another in an
attempt to provide the reader with a clear understanding of how each variable is measured.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables.
Variable

N

Median

Mode

Std.Dev.

Domestic

420

0

1

.012

0

0

.109

Policy

420

0

1

.067

0

0

.250

Social

420

0

1

.014

0

0

.119

Pursuit

420

0

1

.036

0

0

.186

Economic

420

0

1

.045

0

0

.208

Strategic

420

0

1

.064

0

0

.246

Human

420

0

1

.038

0

0

.192

Territory

420

0

1

.040

0

0

.197

Diplomatic

420

0

1

.029

0

0

.167

GDP

420

.137

19.9

3.33

1.80

N/A

3.79

Polity

408

-10

10

-5.55

-7

-10

5.58

0

10

1.12

0

0

2.61

Democracy 408

Min.

Max.

Mean

Ethnicfract

420

.039

.792

.460

.493

N/A

.236

Lingfract

420

.008

.746

.329

.363

N/A

.236

Religfract

420

.002

.789

.269

.235

N/A

.233

Politerr

408

1

5

2.91

3

3

1.20

Civil War

420

0

1

.029

0

0

.167
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Type
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Independent /
Binary
Control /
Continuous
Control /
Ordinal
Control /
Ordinal
Control /
Continuous
Control /
Continuous
Control /
Continuous
Control /
Ordinal
Dependent /
Binary

Hypotheses
Overall, I hypothesize that the type of the intervention strongly effects whether civil war
will occur within the intervened state. Civil war onset is an unintended consequence of the
intervener for those purposes that are directed towards self-interest, as opposed to helping
citizens in the intervened state. Hypotheses one through nine are the key hypotheses; whereas,
hypotheses ten through sixteen are the hypotheses relating to the control variables. Note that the
hypotheses are pertinent to all regression results: the logit regression models accounting for and
omitting the lagged independent variables, in addition to the marginal post-estimations.

H1: An intervention for the purpose of resolving a domestic dispute, which is occurring within
the target state, will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H2: An intervention for the purpose of affecting domestic policies of the target country will
likely increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H3: An intervention for the purpose of protecting a socio-ethnic faction or minority will decrease
the likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H4: An intervention for the purpose of pursing rebel terrorist forces across the border will
increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H5: An intervention for the purpose of protecting the economic interests of the intervening
country will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H6: An intervention for the purpose of strategically pursuing ideological goals will increase the
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likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H7: An intervention for humanitarian purposes will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil
war.
H8: An intervention for the purpose of acquiring or retaining territory will increase the
likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H9: An intervention for the purpose of protecting military property or diplomatic interests will
increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.
H10: A high Gross Domestic Product will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil
war.
H11: An autocratic government of a country will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil
war.
H12: A democratic government of a country is will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil
war.
H13: High ethnic fractionalization within a country is will increase the likelihood of the onset of
civil war.
H14: High linguistic fractionalization within a country will increase the likelihood of the onset
of civil war.
H15: High religious fractionalization within a country is will increase the likelihood of the onset
of civil war.
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H16: High political terror that a government enforces on its citizens will increase the likelihood
of the onset of civil war.

Pooled Analysis
The data in this study are organized with a pooled time series cross sectional analysis,
which consists of the combination of time series and cross-sectional data. This approach
provides the researcher with an efficient method of analysis and improved estimates of the
variables being studied.272 In essence, time series (regular temporal observations of a unit of
analysis) are combined with cross-sections (observations on a unit of analysis at a single time) to
form one data set.273
The main advantage with combining cross sections with time series is that the researcher
is able to capture variations across different units in space, as well as variation that emerge over
time when one unit of analysis.274 This approach is ideal for this study because I am analyzing
the effect that different types of interventions have on civil war onset. My data are limited to the
Middle Eastern / North African region; therefore, it is necessary to include the comparative
component. Also, time series analysis is essential since I am analyzing the effect that an
intervention has on the target country, namely, civil war onset.
For example, if a country intervenes in another in 1980, I need to record whether a civil
272
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war has occurred in any of the years after 1980. Of course, there must be an endpoint at which
an intervention has an influence on the target country‟s stability, which is why I lagged the
independent variables (discussed in the next chapter). Nevertheless, both comparative data and
time series are necessary to test my variables. Therefore, I constructed a panel data set; whereby
all string variables (namely the country year) are converted to longitudinal data.
Aside from the advantage of creating a pooled cross sectional time series (PCTS) design
mentioned above, there are three additional advantages to using the PCTS. First, both time series
and cross-sectional analyses, independently, limit the sample size that can be used in either data
set.275 Limiting the number of spatial units and available data over time may violate basic
assumptions of standard statistical regression analysis, namely spatial autocorrelation.276
The small sample shows an imbalance between the explanatory variables.277 However,
because of the “country-year” observations in pooled PCTS designs, researchers are able to test
the impact of a large number of predictors of the change in the dependent variable within the
framework of multivariate analysis.278
Second, pooled PCTS models permit the inquiry into theoretically important variables
that often escape analytical notice within simple cross-sectional or time-series studies. In other

275

Federico Podesta, “Recent Developments in Quantitative Comparative Methodology: The Case of Pooled Time

Series Cross-Section Analysis.” (2002), 7.
276

Ibid.

277

Ibid.

278

Ibid.

97

words, regression analysis in pooled PCTS data relies upon higher spread of data in respect to
each study independently.
Third, using pooled PCTS allows the researcher to capture the variation of the variables
that emerge through time and space simultaneously. 279 For example, instead of testing a time
series model for only one country using time series data or testing a cross-section model for
multiple countries at one point in time, the PCTS model allows testing for many countries
through whatever time period the researcher chooses.
However, despite these advantages, PCTS may encounter several problems.280 First,
regression error term tend to not be independent across periods; rather, they might be serially
correlated in that errors in the country data at a specific period of time are correlated with errors
in that that country at a prior time period.281 This is connected to the second implication in that
such errors in country i at time t are correlated with errors also in country j at time t. This
inadvertently may create errors for other countries when, independently, there should be none.
The third complication is regarding heteroskedastic errors, such that the error term
may have differing variances across ranges or subsets of nations.282 PCTS models are
particularly vulnerable to those errors because the scale of the predicted dependent variable may
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differ between countries over different periods of time.
In the same vein, errors tend to conceal unit and period effects because heteroskedasticity
and auto-correlation are functions of model misspecification (referring to when an independent
variable‟s value is correlated with the error term).283 The misspecification, which is problematic
for pooled data, is the assumption of homogeneity of the independent variables across units and
time periods. Therefore, if researchers assume that the units and time periods are homogeneous,
as the OLS estimation requires, and they are not, then the least squares estimators will be
biased by not accounting for the possibility of heterogeneity existing among the variables.284
Consequently, the least square estimators will unlikely be a good predictor of the dependent
variable for cross-sectional units and the time periods, and the results may become
heteroskedastic.285
Finally, since the processes linking dependent and independent variables tend to vary
across subsets of nations or periods, errors tend to reflect some varying causal heterogeneity
across space, time, or both.286 Similar to the previously discussed complication, misspecification
could occur and the estimated constant-coefficient models will not accurately capture the causal
heterogeneity across time and space.287 The next chapter discusses how these complications are
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addressed and rectified to produced accurate results.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I will first discuss and justify the regression model that I have specified
and estimated, in addition to a detailed discussion of the results of the regression analysis. The
analysis section will also address whether any of the hypotheses listed in Chapter Four were
statistically supported. The second section will discuss the limitations of this study, while the
last section will address recommendations for future research pertinent to this particular area of
study.

Analysis
The software program that I used to conduct my data analysis was STATA. Not
only am I familiar with STATA, but it is also appropriate to use for analyzing longitudinal data.
To specify and estimate the regression, I used a cross-sectional time-series regression with autoregressive disturbances.288
The following is the standard formula for conducting nonlinear regression analysis: y =

f(β, x) + ε.289 In the formula, “Y” reflects the dependent variable, while “f” represents the
functional form.290 “β” represents the parameters that are to be estimated, and “X” refer to the
predictor variables, all of which are the independent and controlled variables. Finally, the “ε”
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represents the random error, which is assumed to be normally distributed, in addition to being
independent of the errors for other observations.291
The nonlinear regression formula in the context of this study is as follows:

y= civil war (std. error/t-value/pr>| t |

· i.domestic i.policy i.social i.pursuit i.economic

i.strategic i.human i.territory i.diplomatic gdp polity democracy ethnicfract lingfract religfract
politer) + random error.
I instructed to STATA that my data set was longitudinal; whereby, the panel is
“country” and the time is “year.” Doing so was necessary so that STATA would produce results
in the context of analyzing the data set as a PCTS model, as previously discussed in Chapter
Four.
Logistic regression is used to model dichotomous dependent variables. The predicted
values of the regression are to be interpreted as predicted probabilities and the coefficients
interpreted as effects.292 Unlike the coefficients in other regression models, such as Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) or General Least Squares (GLS), the coefficients in logit do not have
intrinsic substantive interpretation attached to them.293 Therefore, the marginal effects for the
binary variables must be calculated using a post-estimation approach to interpret the coefficient.
The marginal effect is an approximation of how much the dependent variable is expected to
291
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increase or decrease for one unit change in an explanatory variable controlling for other
independent variables.294 Only key marginal effects that are statistically significant will be
discussed following the discussion of the regression analyses.
Because the functional form is non-linear, the interpretations of the individual
coefficients do not have the same linear relationship. Therefore, to accurately interpret the
model in terms of determining what assertions the independent variables and control variables
may have on the dependent variable, it is imperative to calculate the marginal effect of each
binary variable while other the other variables are held at their means.295 Fortunately, STATA
has a command that computes the marginal effects in addition to proving the standard error, zscore, and p-value for each variable.
When deciding whether a researcher should use fixed or random effects for the regression
analysis, the selection of a computational model should be based on the expectation about
whether the study shares a common effect size, in addition to the goal in performing the
analysis.296 It makes theoretical sense to use the fixed-effect model if two conditions are met.
First, if the researcher believes that all the cases included in the analysis are functionally
identical.297 Second, if the researcher‟s goal is to compute the common effect size for the
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identified population, and not to generalize to other populations.298 In this study, random effects
are used.
By contrast, random effects should be used when the researcher is accumulating data
from a correlation of cases that had been performed by researchers operating independently
because it would be unlikely that all of the studies were functionally equivalent, given that all
were conducted independently.299
To decide between fixed or random effects, I conducted a Hausman test, whereby if the
test statistic is not statistically significant, then the preferred model is random effects.
Alternatively, if the null hypothesis was significant, then the preferred model is fixed effects.
The Hausman test tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the repressors, whereby the
null hypothesis indicates that they are not.300 After performing the Hausman test, the null
hypothesis was not significant; therefore, I used random effects.
In regards to how the standard errors for the regression coefficients were calculated, I
used the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators (VCE). Additionally, I used the observed
information matrix (OIM), which is the matrix of second derivative, usually of the log-likelihood
function.301 The OIM estimator of the VCE is based on asymptotic maximum-likelihood
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theory.302 The VCE obtained in this way is valid if the errors are independent and identically
distributed normal, which in this case they are because the explanatory variables are not
dependent on one another. Although the estimated VCE is known to be reasonably robust to
violations of the normality assumption, at least as long as the distribution is symmetric and
normal-like, it will then produce accurate standard errors. Clustering is also important since I am
using panel data, and because I had already indicated to STATA that my data is longitudinal
prior to estimating any regressions, STATA automatically accounts for clustering based on a
systematic program tool.
I estimated two regressions: the first without lagging the independent variables and the
second lagging the independent variables by one year. The reason I chose to lag the types of
interventions by one year in the second regression is because an international military
intervention may take time to influence the stability of the targeted country.
For example, if country x intervenes in target country y in 1985 (regardless of the type of
intervention), it may be months before the effects of the foreign presence are felt. Civil war
could break out a year after the intervention has occurred, and it still is linked to the
intervention. Therefore, I lag all independent variables by one year to account for this possibility.
As table 4 indicates, seven of the nine types of military interventions were statistically

301

“Introduction 8 – Robust and Clustered Standard Errors.” STATA Manual 12.0.(2010). March 12, 2015.

http://www.stata.com/manuals13/semintro8.pdf
302

Ibid.

105

significant without lagging the independent variables. In the logit model, the coefficient for
interventions for purposes of taking sides in a domestic dispute has a negative relationship with
civil war onset. It is also statistically significant. This is theoretically expected because such
interventions are generally more hostile because it is unlikely that the adverse party will
welcome the intervention; thus, they are more likely to create civil unrest.
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Table 4. Logit Regression Analysis of the Onset of Civil Wars

Model 1
(Civil War)

Model 2
(Civil War –Lagged Interventions)

Domestic Intervention
Policy Intervention

-1.14 (11.3)
-7.98 (9.61)

-1.16 (9.43)
3.17 (9.12)

Social Intervention
Pursuit Intervention

-1.51 (15.1)
2.91 (1.49)**

2.01 (1.87)
-3.16 (3.45)

Economic Intervention
Strategic Intervention
Humanitarian Intervention
Territorial Intervention
Diplomatic / Military
Intervention
GDP
Polity

.437
4.26
4.89
35.7
4.40

2.16
-5.85
-7.02
-16.3
2.36

-.117 (.120)
-1.33 (1.01)

-.563 (.279)**
.050 (.324)**

Democracy
Ethnic Fractionalization
Linguistic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization
Political Terror
Constant

-.051 (.057)
3.16 (3.09)
-9.72 (3.10)**
4.45 (6.56)
3.73 (1.34)*
-9.05 (5.33)

-.236 (.869)*
-.562 (1.93)
-2.51 (2.60)
-1.71 (2.67)
1.72 (.571)***
-7.59 (3.01)

Pseudo R2

0.549

(10.2)
(11.2)
(16.0)
(6.48)
(14.9)

(.012)
(10.2)
(1.98)*
(9.64)
(7.35)

0.340

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
p<.01*, p<.05**, p<.001*** indicates significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
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However, when the independent variables are lagged by one year, domestic intervention
is no longer statistically significant and actually is negatively asscoiated with civil war. Perhaps
it is because tensions among both parties are high when the intervention first occurs, then begins
to dissipate once the intervening presence has been in the target country for a substantial amount
of time. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the regression model indicating the lagged
variables since domestic intervention is not statistically significant. However, the null
hypothesis is rejected for the logit regression model.
Intervention for the purposes of affecting the target country‟s policies has a negative
relationship with civil war onset in the logit model. The variable was not statistically significant
It may seem counterintuitive that the likelihood of civil war decreases when a country intervenes
to affect policies; however, perhaps the foreign intervention prevented the target country from
developing a civil war due to the very polices that were affected by the intervening county.
Another reason civil war does not occur may be because governments of the target
country do not know that the motive is such. For example, the IMI data set, understandably, does
not include data on what the target country‟s government may have believed the purpose of
the intervention to have been. Therefore, the government of the target country could simply be
ignorant of what the real motive was, thus, being more welcoming to the intervention as opposed
to resisting it.
When the types of interventions are lagged by a year, the policy intervention variable is

108

not statistically significant in the logit model. Also, the relationship with civil war onset is
positive. Perhaps either government officials or the rebels discovered the intervener‟s policychanging motive; as a result, hostilities increased causing civil war to break out. In contrast to
the domestic intervention hypothesis, the policy intervention null hypothesis is rejected for the
regression model lagging the independent variables. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected
for the logit regression model.
An intervention for the purpose of social protection produced the expected regression
results: the variable is negatively associated with civil war onset, but it is not statistically
significant in the logit regression model. It is expected that an intervention for the purpose of
protecting a particular social groups would not spark a civil war because such interventions are
generally non-hostile. Thus, there would be little incentive for rebels to react negatively to the
presence of the intervenors.
However, when types of interventions are lagged one year, the social intervention
variable is no longer statistically significant, and is positively associated with civil war onset.
When a country intervenes to protect a particular social group (for example, an ethnic group or
minority), civil war does not occur within the same year of the intervention and there is no
statistically significant relationship with civil war onset. Perhaps one year after the protection,
other groups begin to feel aggrieved because one group is being favored over another. Over
time, those not benefiting from the protection may begin to organize and attempt to either oust
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the interveners or those being protected. Thus, civil war ensues. The null hypothesis is rejected
for the regression model without the lagged independent variable. However, the null hypothesis
is not rejected in the regression model including the lagged variables.
This finding of the social protection intervention variable as having a positive
relationship with civil war is at the core of the grievance–based argument that Taydas (2011),
and Regan and Norton (2005), argued. Similarly, the finding is in line with Regan and Norton‟s
(2005) argument that ethnic or religious hatred could form grievances that lead to civil war.
Although the social protection intervention variable is not specific to minority or ethnic groups,
such groups are included in the social variable within the IMI‟s data set. The findings here are
contrary to Fearon and Laitin‟s (2003) argument that citizens‟ grievances were not enough to
increase the likelihood of civil war onset.
Intervention for the purpose of pursuing rebel terrorist forces across the border has a
positive relationship with civil war onset and it is highly statistically significant in the logit
regression model. This can be explained by the fact that foreigners are generally unwelcome
guests in the context of intervening without the permission of the target country‟s government.
Thus, to intervene in a sovereign country to catch rebels who may not even be a threat to the host
country, may cause citizens to resist the interveners and lash out in violence of their presence.
Another possible theoretical explanation is that perhaps the rebels or terrorist groups who
are being chased across the border have connections to citizens of the target country. Thus,
when an intervening country attempts to catch the rebels, those related citizens are then called on
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for reinforcement, which creates a “side-taking” atmosphere whereby rebel supporters begin
arming against non-rebels. As a result, civil war breaks out.
The pursuit intervention variable is no longer significant in the logit model when the
independent variables are lagged by one year, and the relationship with civil war changes to
negative. A possible explanation as to why the pursuit intervention variable changes to negative
a year after the intervention may be because the intervening force caught the rebels or terrorist
group(s) before the violation could escalate.
Another possibility is that the mission to pursue the individuals may have been covert;
thus, the intervener captured the target and left the target country before anyone discovered
either the troops or the purpose of being there. The null hypothesis is rejected for both
model forms.
Interventions for the purpose of protecting economic or resource interests of the
intervener, as well as interventions protecting military property or diplomatic interests, were
statistically significant in the regression without lagging the variables. Both economic and
diplomatic intervention variables have a positive relationship with civil war onset. Although the
relationships remain positive with civil war onset after lagging the independent variables by one
year, the economic and diplomatic variables are no longer statistically significant.
These results are theoretically sound because a foreigner invading to protect its economic
interest would likely facilitate an immediate reaction, given that the economy affects large
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numbers of citizens living in the target country. Therefore, when a foreign presence invades for
the purpose of protecting its economic interest, it could, in turn, tarnish the economy and
negatively impact the society as a whole. This potential harm to the economy may likely
provoke a volatile and immediate response, whereby civil unrest would break out. The null
hypothesis is rejected in the regression model without lagging the independent variables;
however, it is not rejected in the regression model including the lagged variables.
In the same vein, a country intervening to protect its diplomatic interests or military
property may cause rebels, particularly, to organize and fight for the military equipment. In
fact, the equipment could have been looted and, when foreign troops enter the country to reclaim
its property, rebels would raise arms to protect it. Similar to the economic intervention
hypothesis, the null is rejected for the diplomatic intervention hypothesis in the regression model
without the lagged independent variables; however, it is not rejected in the regression model
including the lagged independent variables.
Strategic intervention with the goal of stability, regional power balances, or pursuing
ideological goals produced the most counter-intuitive results. The independent variable is highly
statistically significant, and has a negative relationship with civil war onset in both models. This
is surprising given that it was the second-most frequently occurring type of intervention out of
the nine that were tested, as shown in table 5. Despite there being numerous strategic
interventions, the data shows that there is a negative relationship with civil war onset.
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Nevertheless, the null hypothesis is rejected in both regression models.
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Table 5. Relative Sum of International Military Interventions
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Domestic Intervention
.012
.109
Policy Intervention
.067
.250
Social Intervention
.014
.119
Pursuit Intervention
.036
.189
Economic Intervention
.045
.208
Strategic Intervention
.064
.246
Humanitarian Intervention
.038
.192
Territorial Intervention
.040
.197
Diplomatic / Military Intervention
.029
.167
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: 0 minimum; 1 maximum
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One explanation for the negative association with civil war could be that the government
of the target country simply did not know that the intervener had the motivation to strategically
sending troops as a means of pursing its ideological goals, similar to the reasoning for the social
policy intervention mentioned above. Another explanation could be that the intervener only
invaded countries that it knew would create the least resistance or chaos; thus, civil war would
not likely follow the intervention. For example, if a country seeks to gain regional influence, it
could intervene into a country that it has a good relationship with; therefore, intervening into the
target country would be more accepting of its citizens. To test these theories, a larger sample
size is needed, which is a limitation in this study and is addressed in the next section.
The humanitarian intervention coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in the
logit mode. Contrary to what was expected, the variable has a positive relationship with civil
war onset. Interestingly, the relationship with civil war onset changes to negative when the types
of interventions are all lagged by one year. The humanitarian intervention coefficient estimate is
not statistically significant in the regression model including the lagged independent variables.
Generally, humanitarian missions do not create internal conflict within the target country
because most are seen as peacekeeping missions.303 Perhaps, the Middle Eastern / North African
region is unique in this respect, given that the relationship with civil war is positive in the logit
model. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the logit estimation, but it is rejected when
lagging the independent variables by one year.
303
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The last independent variable to be discussed, intervention for the purpose of attempting
to acquire or retain territory, produced similar results as the humanitarian intervention variable
mentioned above. Territorial intervention is not statistically significant and the data reveal a
positive relationship with civil war onset. However, lagging the independent variables by one
year changes the relationship with civil war onset from positive to negative. The null hypothesis
is not rejected for both models given that the variable is not statistically significant.
A potential reason why there may be a positive relationship in the same year as the
intervention as opposed to a negative one a year later may be because of the occurrence of
military interventions that have occurred by neighboring countries, given the geographic
convenience. Should the target country be experiencing internal conflict, even at a minimal
level, countries geographically proximate to the target country may take advantage of the target
country‟s vulnerability and intervene for the purpose of acquiring territory belonging to the
target country.
Thus, by an intervenor invading for the purpose of acquiring territory could exploit the
conflict and cause it to intensify. After the area has either been acquired or the intervener
withdraws a year after the intervention, civil war would be unlikely to break out.
Next, I turn to the results for the control variables. Expectedly, the GDP variable has a
negative relationship with civil war onset in both estimations, and is statistically significant only
in the lagged independent variables estimation. Thus, as a country‟s GDP increases, the
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likelihood of civil war onset decreases. Therefore, there does seem to be an association between
low GDP and civil war. The null hypothesis is rejected in the regression model including the
lagged independent variables, but is not rejected in the specification without the lagged the
independent variables.
The Polity variable is not statistically significant in the first regression model, and it
had a positive relationship with civil war onset. However, Polity has a negative relationship with
civil war once the independent variables are lagged by one year. The negative relationship was
expected because it is theoretically sound that the less autocratic a country is, the frequency of
civil war onsets decreases. This relates back to the grievance arguments: citizens who are
aggrieved by the state will are more likely to rebel against the government.
These results are contrary to what Hegre, et. al (2001) found because it is not
intermediate regimes that are more conducive to civil war onset, but rather autocracies that tend
to be associated with civil war onset. The null hypothesis is not rejected in the first regression
model, but is rejected in the second, when the types of intervention variable are lagged by one
year.
The democracy variable also had the theoretically expected relationship with civil war
onset in that the more democratic a country is, the liklihood of civil war onset decreases.
Democracy is not statistically significant in either of the estimation models. These results
support Bodea and Elbadawi‟s (2007) findings that democratic countries have a negative
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relationship with civil war onset. The null hypothesis is not rejected in either regression models,
given that the Democracy variable is not statistically significant.
I hypothesized that the more ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized a
country is, the more likely civil war would occur. The results for ethnic and religious
fractionalization were the same in terms of statistical significance in that the variables were not
statistically significant in either of the regression models. Similarly, ethnic and religious
fractionalization have a positive relationship with civil war onset in the first regression model.
Thus, as the ethnic and religious fractionalization increases within a country, as, too, will the
frequency of civil war onset.
However, the variables change from having a positive relationship to a negative
relationship once the independent variables are lagged by one year. It is surprising that the more
ethnical and religious fractionalization there is in country, the less likely civil war will occur.
My initial thought was perhaps all of the twenty countries in the sample size were similar in
terms of fractionalization scores, thus having a modicum effect on civil war. However, table 6
shows, the countries were highly diverse from one another in terms of Alesina‟s (2003)
fractionalization scores. Nevertheless, these are the observed findings. Therefore, the null
hypotheses for the ethnic and religious fractionalization variables are not rejected.
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Table 6. Relative Variation between Fractionalization Variables
Variable

Mean

Ethnic Fractionalization
Linguistic Fractionalization

.460
.329

.039
.008

.792
.746

Religious Fractionalization

.269

.002

.787

Note: Alesina‟s (2003) fractionalization data

\
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Min

Max

The positive association between religious fractionalization and civil war onset after
lagging the independent variables could be attributed to the fact that the dominant religion in
both the Middle East and North African region is Islam, and there are many different factions
within the religion. Therefore, citizens may be more likely to have religious hatred for those not
following their faction of religion. For example, Islam is not just a system of faith, but it is a way
of life. Namely, the Shiites and Sunnis are two religious factions that split in the eighth century
because persons were unable to decide whether it should be a friend to Mohammad or bloodline
to succeed the Prophet Mohammad after his death.304 The split has diversified even further
throughout the last two centuries with some factions becoming more Islam fundamentalists while
others more pro-Western. This diversification within the Islam religion could be why a high level
of religious fractionalization has a positive relationship with civil war onset.
By contrast, linguistic fractionalization is statistically significant in the first estimation,
but not statistically significant when the independent variables are lagged by one year.
Linguistic fractionalization has a negative relationship with civil war onset in both regression
models. Thus, as the linguistic fractionalization increases in a country, the likelihood of civil
war onsets decreases. The null hypothesis is rejected in the first regression model, but is not
rejected in the specification that includes the lagged independent variables.
Finally, the political terror variable is highly statistically significant and has a positive
relationship with civil war onset in both regression models. Thus, the more politically repressive
304
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a government is, the more likely civil war will occur. The null hypothesis is rejected in both
regression models. This results are not surprising because the more repressive a government it,
the more citizens will begin to feel aggrieved, and are more likely to rebel against the
government.
Some scholars have argued that the more repressive a country is, the less likely citizens
will rebel due to the strong hold that the government has on its citizens. However, this may be
true for protests and other minor forms of resistance, but it is not the case for civil war onset, as
the data has shown.
When accounting for the marginal effects, holding all other independent variables at their
means, the likelihood of a pursuit intervention resulting facilitating civil war onset increases by
8%. When a diplomatic intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war goes up to 15%.
When a strategic intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war occurring a year after the
intervention increases by 28%. When a territory intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war
occurring within a year after the intervention increases by an outstanding 87%.

Limitations

This research is limited to 20 countries all within the Middle Eastern and North African
Regions, in which twelve civil wars occurred within the time period that is studied. Analyzing
the effect that 129 international military interventions have on a limited twelve civil wars may

121

not yield enough explanatory power. Therefore, the study would be strengthened if there were a
larger number of civil wars to analyze.
Additionally, using a time series data set for the ethnic, linguistic, and religious
fractionalization scores may have produced more finite results for those three control variables.
Although a country‟s ethnic, linguistic, and religious oval makeup does not alter substantially
over a 20 year period, it does vary slightly as citizens are constantly relocating in terms of
immigrating and emigrating, in addition to new citizens being born and other dying on a
daily basis. Thus, the ethnic composition, particularly, of a country will naturally fluctuate. It
would be interesting to determine whether, and to what extent, the regression results change if a
time series data set was to replace Alesina‟s fractionalization data that was used.
A third limitation of this study is the absence of existing literature that there are on topics
such as consequences, and types of foreign military interventions. Although scholars have
conducted studies regarding the effects that third party interventions have on civil wars, there has
been little work completed on the consequences that military interventions have on the targeted
country. Granted, it is difficult to generalize the consequences of an intervention, given that each
intervention and target country are indeed unique. However, it would be advantageous for this
study if there were at least some studies that made an attempt to generalize the consequences that
the interventions have had on the target country. Such studies would provide a more
theoretically-grounded insight as to what the conditions are in in the target country after the
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intervention. The conditions could then be compared to the different causes of civil war that
scholars have argued in an attempt see if there are any patterns of post-intervention conditions
linking to the causes of civil war.
There is even less work that has been done on the different types of foreign military
intervention. It is surprising that scholars have generalized “intervention” where the purposes of
the intervention makes such a large difference in the effect of the target country. For example,
welcomed interventions are less likely to cause civil unrest, whereas hostile interventions are
more likely to internal violence. Also, the number of troops makes a difference in the outcome
of the intervention.
Also, it is unlikely that a country sending 500 troops into another for a humanitarian
mission will create chaos in the targeting country. Contrarily, a country sending 10,000 troops
for a social protection mission is likely to cause resistance of acceptance by the rebels, given not
only the large amount of troops, but also the type of intervention. Because the central theme of
this study is civil war being an unintended consequence of international military intervention,
having a lack of existing literature on the different types of interventions is certainly a limitation.

Future Research
This thesis not only contributes to the existing literature by examining the relationship
between international military intervention and civil war onset, but it also sets the precedent for
further research on different types of interventions. Scholars could expand this study to test not
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only countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but also other regions, namely Africa. Civil
war tends to be experienced in underdeveloped countries; thus, Africa would be a fascinating
region to study in the context of foreign intervention and civil war. Not only does Africa consist
mainly of developing countries, but it has been host to numerous foreign military
interventions and civil wars since WWII.
COW covers the time period from 1816 to 2010, while the IMI data set includes data
from 1946 to 2005, thus, researchers could take on the ambitious tasks of conducting a systemic
study in which all interventions since WWII are regressed with all civil wars post-WWII. Such a
large sample size could produce more conclusive results that will refine our understanding of the
impact that international military interventions has on civil war onset. Furthermore, additional
control variables could be added to the study, such as whether a country has been formerly
colonized or not. The IMI data set includes such information for every country, and it would be
useful to know whether a country‟s colonial history has any relationship with civil war onset.
The theoretical expectation is that there is pattern of interventions by a former colonizer in to a
former colony. However, it would be an interesting study to determine whether the data supports
the theoretical expectation.
Anecdotally, the Middle East and North Africa are all former colonies of the United
Kingdom; however, most great powers have never been colonized. Thus, colonization may have
an impact on whether a country is likely to experience internal conflict when a former colonizer
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intervenes into the country that it once colonized.
For example, Lebanon was invaded by France, a former imperial power, in 1982 for
domestic, social, strategic, and diplomatic purposes. One year after the intervention, civil war
occurred. Another example is the 2004 French invasion into the Ivory Coast, also a former
France colony, which led to an outbreak of civil war. Such patterns warrant further investigation.
Another variable to possibly examine is the number of troops; for which the IMI has also
provided data for. Given that the IMI has provided data on the number of troops that were sent
for each intervention, it may useful to use this data as a control variable. The number of troops
sent into the target country could affect whether civil war will ensure because it could be a
strong determinant of whether citizens of the target state feel threatened by the foreign presence.
It is unlikely that the presence of 100 troops will make the citizens of the target country feel
threatened; however, a presence of 500 may cause citizens to feel threatened, or perhaps
repressed. Thus, a theoretically understandable reaction would be for the citizens to rise up in
rebellion.
Additionally, it may be interesting to examine how many troops are dispatched generally
for each type of military intervention. If there is a pattern of similar quantities of troops being
dispatched for each respective type of intervention, then perhaps it is not type of the intervention
that is conduce to civil war onset. Rather, it may be the amount of troops that intervene into the
target country that affects the likelihood of civil war onset.
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDIES

Interestingly, Iran and Afghanistan are both Middle Eastern countries with similar ethnic,
linguistic, and religious fractionalization whereby all citizens are governed by similar repressive
political structure. Yet, the joint invasion led by the United States and Great Britain in Iran in
1953 did not result in civil war; whereas, the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 did
result in civil war. In this chapter, I will analogize the two case events and dissect the differences
in an attempt to explain why civil war occurred in Afghanistan but did not occur in Iran. First, a
brief description of the facts for each case is needed.

1953 United States intervention into Iran
The 1953 intervention into Iran, named “Operation TP-AJAX,” was a joint covert
operation whereby the U.S.‟s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Great Britain invaded Iran
with the objective of overthrowing the elected government and, instead, consolidate the power of
the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.305
Great Britain had an economic interest in Iran, as they were owners of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company. Prior to the invention, the Iranian government began questioning whether their
government was actually receiving the royalties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that they
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were due. Therefore, Prime Minister Mohammd Mosaddegh requested an audit from the British
government, in which the British denied. As a consequence of the denial, Mosaddegh
nationalized the oil company, requiring an equal share in the oil revenues.
In 1952, the British then embargoed, causing economic tensions in Iran that resulted in
unpopularity for the Iranian Prime Minister. Tehran had failed to find ways of getting alternative
oil sources; as a result of the failure, the budge began mounting deficits and economy began to
deteriorate.306
The royal court began getting frustrated with Mosaddegh‟s attempts to continuously
undermined the monarchy, so the British government announced that the Shah had intended to
leave the country for medical purposes.307 The Iranian citizens interpreted, as the British had
intended, that the Shah leaving was a signal of his displeasure with Mosaddegh. Thus, the public
began to grow increasingly intolerant of the Mosaddegh administration.
Taking advantage of both the unpopularity of Mosaddegh and vulnerability of the
Iranian economy, the British sought help from the United States in overthrowing Prime Minister
Mosaddegh and reinstating the pro-Western Shah, whom did not question the financial activities
of the British.
This incident had made the U.S. government aware of the opposition groups both within
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and outside Iran‟s parliament.308 It also revealed that there were many citizens still loyal to the
Shah, and encouraged the idea that the Shah would be accepted back into office by the people,
should the U.S. support it.309 The U.S. feared that the continuing deteriorating economy would
pave the way for the “Tudeh,” Iran‟s communist party, to overthrow Mosaddegh and take control
of the government.310 Therefore, the CIA coordinated with the British intelligence agency, mi6,
and together they launched a propaganda campaign that evolved into pro-Shah riots, resulting in
the deaths of 800 Iranian citizens.311
The Shah, whom was hiding in Italy at the time the riots occurred, returned to Iran to
reinstate him as the Prime Minister. Given that the economy under the control of Mosaddegh‟s
administration, the former leader was blamed and the citizens favored the reinstatement of the
Shah. Once in power, the embargo was dropped and the economy began growing. Additionally,
the riots ceased and no further civil violence erupted. Thus, the coup was successful and the
Shah subsequently ruled as an absolute monarchy for twenty-six years.
Both Great Britain and the U.S. intervened in Iran for the purpose of affecting domestic
policies. Great Britain also intervened for the purpose of protecting economic interest. In
addition to seeking to affect domestic policies, the U.S. also intervened for the strategic purpose
of promoting ideological goals.
308

Ibid. at 6.

309

Ibid.

310

Ibid.

311

Ibid. at 7.

128

Both of the great powers intervened in Iran for the purpose of affecting Iran‟s domestic
policies by attempting to manipulate the oil agreement that Great Britain had with Iran. For
example, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company paid a royalty to the Iranian government for the oil that
was extracted. The profits of the company, however, were taxed by the British government and
these taxes were greater than the royalties that the Iranian government received from the
company.
Mosaddegh had nationalized the oil in an effort to avoid the exorbitant taxes.
Reinstating the Shah would reverse Mosaddegh‟s policy, and transactions with the British would
resume. In fact on the day of his appointment, the new prime minister announced his intention
of resuming business with Great Britain.
Although the United States did not have ownership of the oil company, it was
nonetheless advantaged by having business resume with the British because it, too, would have
oil supplied to it. Additionally, the Shah was pro-western and anti-communist; therefore, the
U.S. government would have friendly relations with the Iranian government if the Shah, and not
Mosaddegh, were in power.
Great Britain also intervened in Ian for the purpose of protecting their economic interest.
This is largely because oil exploration generally requires a huge investment, which must be made
prior to producing any profits. Therefore the British had already invested a large amount of
money prior to Mosaddegh‟s policy of nationalizing the oil.
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The Iranian government refraining from paying the tax on the oil that was extracted
would undercut the entire petroleum business that the British had invested in.312 This is why the
British government initially demanded the continuation of the business, and when Mosaddegh
administration refused, the embargo was placed on Iran. To protect their economic interest, Great
Britain was incentivized to invade and conduct the regime change.
The U.S. intervened in Iran for the strategic purpose of promoting ideological goals
because the government wanted Iran to be pro-western so that the U.S. could remain a major
player in the Middle East. There has been ample work on U.S. exerting hegemony in the Middle
East; however, reasons beyond the fact that the U.S. has ideological goals that it wants to pursue
exceeds the scope of this thesis.
The data has shown that interventions that occur for the purpose of strategically pursuing
ideological goals has a negative relationship with civil war onset. Similarly, interventions
attempting to affect domestic policies of the target state are more likely to result in civil war
onset a year after the intervention has occurred; whereas, the intervention has a negative
relationship with civil war onset within the first year of the intervention occurring. Additionally,
interventions for the purpose of protecting economic interests has a negative relationship with
civil war onset.
In light of the U.S./UK joint intervention into Iran, in addition to what the data has
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revealed, the observed findings support the association between the types of interventions that
occurred and the absence of civil war onset that followed. For example, the data showed that
interventions for the purposes of affecting policies of the target state, economic interests of the
intervener, and strategic purposes were all three negatively associated with civil war onset.
These three motivations were the justification for the U.S. and the UK intervention into
Iran. However, as the data has shown and the facts in the Iranian case study have revealed, civil
war onset did not occur after the intervention. Thus, the data supports the relationship between
intervention and civil war onset in the Iranian case study.
However, there are other factors that may mitigate the likelihood of civil war onset,
absent of any association with the foreign military intervention. For example, the intervention
into Iran was covert, the leader was unfavorable, and the regime change was favored by the
Iranian citizens. Referring to the first factor, the fact that there were no present military troops
and the riots were staged, the citizens were not alarmed because they were not threatened by an
outside presence.
Also, Mosaddegh‟s administration allowed, or at least it was perceived to have allowed,
the economy to deteriorate. Consequently, the citizens began affirming the regime change,
especially given that the economy was not in decline when the Shah was in power before
Mosaddegh was elected.
In sum, there are factors that may mitigate the likelihood of civil war onset, regardless of
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the purpose of the intervention. The better understanding that researchers have on factors,
conditions, and types of interventions that effect civil war onset, the better they will know how to
prevent it. In the section below, I contrast this case with the 1979 Soviet Union invasion into
Afghanistan, in which civil war did occur following the intervention.

1979 Soviet Union intervention into Afghanistan
The target state in the Soviet intervention did not enjoy the same successful aftereffect as
the target state did in the US/UK invasion. In 1978, the centrist Afghanistan government was
overthrown by left-wing military officers, who then handed power over to two Marxist-Leninist
political parties, the Khalq and Parcham.313 This coup is known as the “Saur Revolution.”314
Together, these two political parties formed the People‟s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA).
The party immediately forged close ties with the Soviet Union, given their similar
socialist policy goals. Thus, just months after the PDPA rose to power, a friendship treaty was
signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.315 Even prior to the official signing of the
treaty, the Soviet Union had been a major influence in terms of policy making in Afghanistan,
notably due to the immense amounts of economic aid, military equipment provided to the PDPA
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government, in addition to military training.316
As a consequence of the PDPA consolidating power, Muslim tribal-based insurgencies,
the mujahideen, began uprising by internally fighting with PDPA supports. The mujahideen were
composed of two alliances: the Peshawar Seven and the Tehran Eight, which were both a multinational insurgent group that were funded by the U.S. government to help overthrow the Sovietbacked regime in power.
In 1979, the PDPA called on the Soviet Union to provide military support and assist in
calming down the unrest. However, the presence of the Soviets exacerbated a nationalistic
feeling and caused the rebellions to grow in alarming numbers.317 Two months after the Soviets
invaded, civil war broke out and lasted until the Soviets withdrew in ten years, claiming the lives
of approximately 1.2 million citizens. Following several assassinations within the PDPA
administration, Babrak Karmal became the leader of the PDPA party; thus, president of
Afghanistan.318
The government of President Karmal, a Soviet puppet regime, was utterly ineffective and
the lack of leadership was blamed by Moscow for the problems of Afghanistan. President
Karmal was not able to consolidate his power, thus stepping down. In 1986, the former chief of
the Afghan secret police (KHAD) and Soviet-backed Mohammad Najibullah was elected
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president.319
After six years in office, Najibullah‟s government collapsed as a result of the Russian
government withdrawal of forces, thus ending its aid to the Afghan government. One of the
mujahideen rebels, Burhanuddin Rabbani, became the next president in 1992, and was
recognized as such by the United Nations.
Focusing strictly on the invasion, the Soviets had four objectives when invading
Afghanistan: (1) to ensure that the government of Afghanistan remained friendly to the Soviet
Union; (2) to limit, or if possible exclude, American influence; (3) to limit the effect of
fundamental Islam on their own republics; (4) to extinguish the drug traffic, which was a massive
problem.320
The first objective speaks to the interventions for the purposes of both selecting a side in
a domestic dispute and to affect policies of the target state. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to
aid the PDPA against the mujahideen; therefore, they were clearly intervening to take sides in a
domestic dispute. Additionally, the Soviets wanted to remain on good terms with the Afghan
government so that they could influence policy making both during and beyond the conflict
The second objective is an example of an intervention for the strategic purpose, namely
an effort to maintain regional power by preventing the U.S. from exerting any influence in
Afghanistan. The third and fourth objectives are also examples of interventions for strategic
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purposes, but for different reasons than the second objective.
Limiting the effect of fundamental Islamism on the Russian people is an attempt to keep
the region stable; therefore, the purpose of intervening into Afghanistan, for objective three, was
to contain fundamental Islam. Similarly, the fourth objective is a reason to intervene for the
purpose of strategically attempting to stabilize the Soviet Union by stunting the drug traffic from
entering the intervener‟s country.
In sum, the civil war that occurred as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan
is reflective of what the data revealed. For example, an intervention for the purpose of taking
sides in a domestic dispute is not only statistically significant, but also has positive association
with civil war onset. Thus, the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan for the purpose of militarily
supporting the government may have very well been the reason why civil war occurred.
The data also shows that interventions for the purpose of affecting policies of the target
country have a positive relationship with civil war onset once the independent variables are
lagged by one year. Thus, this, too, could have affected the instability of Afghanistan, which
made civil war inevitable. Although the Soviet Union also intervened into Afghanistan for
strategic purposes, which has a negative relationship with civil war onset, the strong correlation
that the other two interventions have with civil war onset could have independently caused the
civil war to occur.
The facts in this event are strikingly different than those in the 1953 US/UK invasion in
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Iran. For example, the Soviet Union intervention was overt because assistance was actually
requested by the PDPA administration. Also, the centrist government led by Mohammad Daud
Khan, was not necessarily disfavored by the people. In fact, he created a new Afghan
constitution in 1977, improving rights for women, which was widely accepted within the
country.
Finally, unlike the citizens in Iran, the regime-change that ousted Khan and implemented
the PDPA was not favored by the majority of the people, namely the mujahideen. Perhaps these
factors affect whether an intervention will facilitate civil war onset. Although there are only two
cases discussed, it is nonetheless a starting point to understanding the effect(s) that international
military interventions have on civil war onset.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the association between foreign military
intervention and civil war onset, generally, and whether the purpose of the intervention makes a
difference as to whether civil war is likely to follow the intervention, more specifically.
Running two regression models using the logit regression for data that has been collected
for twenty countries in the time period from 1980 to 2000 has produced both expected and
surprising results. Overall, the data shows that one of the nine types of interventions is
statically significant. When lagging the independent variables by one year, there is still one type
of interventions that is statistically significant. Of the control variables, only linguistic
fractionalization and political terror were statistically significant, while GDP, polity, democracy,
and political terror were all statistically significant after lagging the types of interventions by one
year.
The empirical results show that civil war onset is positively associated with an
intervention for the purpose of pursuing a terrorists or rebel across the target country‟s border.
By contrast, humanitarian intervention is statistically significant and has a negative association
with civil war onset once all independent variables are lagged by one year.
The results of the control variables seem to be in the accordance with Collier and
Hoeffler (2004), and in some respects, Fearon and Laitin (2003). The data has shown that the
higher the GDP is in a country, the less likely civil war will occur. This is the underlying
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premise of Collier and Hoeffler‟s economic model. Similar to Fearon and Laitin, the ethnic and
religious fractionalization variables were not statistically significant and have a positive effect on
civil war onset. Interestingly, the two variables have a negative association with civil war onset
one year after the intervention occurred. However, neither variable was statistically significant.
By contrast, the linguistic fractionalization variable is significant and is negatively
associated with civil war onset.

As expected, the political terror variable is statistically

significant and has a positive association with civil war onset, with civil war occurring in the
same year as the intervention and one year after.
Since WWII, intrastate war has been the dominant form of conflict while becoming more
serious both in intensity and duration than interstate wars. The increase in intrastate wars is
alarming because it creates not only instability within its relative region, but also creates a haven
for terrorist whom take advantage of the vulnerability of the state. Therefore, understanding the
causes of civil wars is becoming increasingly imperative.
The IMI data has been incredibly useful for this study in that it has categorized
interventions that have occurred in all regions of the world over the last sixty years. Using a
particular region in a twenty year period, I was able to regress these different types of
interventions with civil wars that have occurred by the using the COW data set. The regression
models have shown that international military interventions can have an effect on civil war onset,
and the type of interventions do make a difference as to whether civil war is likely to occur.
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This study contributes to the existing literature by suggesting that the term “intervention”
should not be generalized. Each type of intervention may produce different consequences for the
target country. Knowing the consequences of a particular intervention is important because it
may result in unfavorable consequences that the intervenor had not intended to create. If such
consequences of an intervention are able to be predicted, then leaders are less likely to intervene
for that particular purpose. Governments should be cautious when intervening particularly for
either humanitarian purposes or for the purpose of pursing a rebel or terrorists group across the
target country‟s border since the data has shown that such interventions increase the likelihood of
civil war onset.
With the increase in both intrastate wars and international military interventions, I invite
scholars to develop this research further to determine whether there is an association between the
two occurrences on a systemic level. Understanding not only the consequences of international
military intervention, but also the causes of civil war onset could aid governments by preventing
either occurrence in the future.
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APPENDIX A:
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS, IMI DATA SET
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Intervener
Country
Saudi Arabia

Target
Country
Yemen

United States

Iran

Iran

Iraq

Iraq

Iran

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Finland

Pakistan

Iran

Kuwait

Israel

Iraq

Yemen

Oman

India

Pakistan

Pakistan

Saudi
Arabia

Multinational
forces in Egypt

Egypt

Start
End Date Type of
Date
Intervention
02/29/1980 05/31/1980 Policy
Economic
Strategic
04/25/1980 04/25/1980 Policy
Humanitarian
Diplomatic
09/04/1980 07/13/1982 Policy
Strategic
Territorial
Diplomatic
09/22/1980 08/20/1988 Policy
Economic
Strategic
Territorial
09/27/1980 09/30/1980 Policy
Pursuit
Strategic
09/30/1980 02/28/1982 Policy
Pursuit
Strategic
11/12/1980 08/20/1988 Policy
Economic
Strategic
Diplomatic
07/07/1981 06/07/1981 Policy
Strategic
Territory
Diplomatic
06/30/1981 07/31/1982 Domestic
Strategic
07/11/1981 07/14/1981 Policy
Economic
Territory
12/31/1981 12/31/1981 Policy
Economic
Strategic
03/10/1982 12/31/1988 Policy
Humanitarian
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Description
Border & N-S
merger
Hostage Crisis

Shell and
Retaliation

Gulf war

Afghanistan
insurgency
Afghanistan war

Gulf war

Destroy reactor

Post-DhofarBidwill
Kashmir-line

Protect royal
family
U.S. led MNF in
Sinai-Riggs

Israel

Lebanon

United States

Lebanon

Iran

Iraq

France

Lebanon

Italy

Lebanon

United States

Lebanon

United Kingdom

Lebanon

United States

Lebanon

France

Lebanon

Italy

Lebanon

06/06/1982 06/30/1985 Domestic
Social
Pursuit
Economic
Strategic
Territory
06/24/1982 06/24/1982 Policy
Humanitarian
Diplomatic
07/13/1982 08/20/1988 Policy
Economic
Strategic
Territory
08/21/1982 09/20/1982 Policy
Social
Strategic
Humanitarian
08/21/1982 09/20/1982 Policy
Social
Strategic
Humanitarian
08/25/1982 09/01/1982 Policy
Social
Strategic
Humanitarian
08/27/1982 09/20/1982 Policy
Social
Strategic
Humanitarian
08/29/1982 03/30/1984 Domestic
Social
Strategic
Diplomatic
08/20/1982 03/30/1984 Domestic
Social
Strategic
Diplomatic
09/20/1982 02/20/1984 Domestic
Social
Strategic
Diplomatic
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Lebanon civil
war Evacuation

Lebanon civil
war Evacuation
Gulf War

Evacuating PLO

Evacuating PLO

Evacuating PLO

Evacuating PLO

Lebanon civil
war

Lebanon civil
war

Lebanon civil
war

United Kingdom

Lebanon

USSR

Syria

Turkey

Iraq

USSR

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Morocco
India

Algeria
Pakistan

United Kingdom

Egypt

France

Egypt

United States

Saudi
Arabia

United States

Egypt

USSR

Yemen

Israel

Lebanon

12/31/1982 02/03/1984 Domestic
Social
Strategic
Diplomatic
03/31/1983 12/31/1988 Policy
Strategic
05/26/1983 12/31/1987 Domestic
Strategic
09/18/1983 12/31/1988 Policy
Pursuit
Strategic
09/19/1983 12/31/1988 Policy
Pursuit
Strategic
06/14/1984 06/14/1984 Policy
06/30/1984 12/31/1987 Policy
Territory
08/14/1984 12/31/1984 Policy
Economic
Humanitarian
Diplomatic
08/14/1984 12/31/1984 Policy
Economic
Humanitarian
Diplomatic
08/15/1984 12/31/1984 Policy
Economic
Humanitarian
Diplomatic
08/17/1984 12/31/1984 Policy
Economic
Humanitarian
Diplomatic
08/19/1984 12/31/1984 Policy
Humanitarian
Diplomatic
01/02/1986 12/31/1988 Domestic
Social
Pursuit
Strategic
Territory
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Lebanon civil
war

SAM Missiles
Kurd rebel
Afghanistan war

Afghanistan
insurgency
Border incurs
Kashmir glacier
Red Sea mine
clear

Red Sea mine
clear

Red Sea mine
clear

Red Sea mine
clear

Red Sea mine
clear
Southern zone

United States

Sweden

United Nations
United Nations
United Nations
United Nations
Pakistan

Libya

03/24/1986 04/15/1986 Policy
Economic
Strategic
Territory
Diplomatic
Bahrain
04/26/1986 05/31/1986 Policy
Economic
Territory
Afghanistan 05/16/1988 12/31/1988 Policy
Humanitarian
Pakistan
05/16/1988 12/31/1988 Policy
Humanitarian
Iran
08/10/1988 12/31/1988 Policy
Humanitarian
Iraq
08/10/1988 12/31/1988 Policy
Humanitarian
Afghanistan 02/15/1989 09/01/1998 Domestic
Strategic

Afghanistan

Pakistan

04/06/1989 06/26/1990 Pursuit
Strategic
Diplomatic
08/21/1989 08/25/1989 Pursuit
Humanitarian
Diplomatic

France

Lebanon

United States

Lebanon

09/06/1989 09/06/1989 Diplomatic

India

Pakistan

03/12/1990 12/21/1990 Territory

Bangladesh

Kuwait

08/01/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory
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Anti-Libya
bombing

Disputed islands

Obs. Accords
Obs. Accords
Peace
Observation
Peace
Observation
Pakistan military
supports
Mujahideen
rebels
Afghan. Fires
Scuds and RPGs
into Pakistan
French warships
fire in Lebanon
against RJO to
protect French
nationals
U.S. evacuates
diplomats from
Lebanon
India initiates
firing into
Pakistan after
mobilizing troops
in disputed
territory
Bangladesh
troops part of
Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait

Iraq

Kuwait

08/02/1990 02/27/1990 Economic
Strategic
Territory

United States

Saudi
Arabia

08/08/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

United States

Kuwait

United Kingdom

Saudi
Arabia

08/11/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory
08/11/1991 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

United Kingdom

Kuwait

08/11/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Morocco

Saudi
Arabia

08/11/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Egypt

Saudi
Arabia

08/11/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Egypt

Kuwait

08/11/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory
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Iraq invades
Kuwait &
establishes a
provisional govt.
U.S. in Saudi
Arabia to protect
it from Iraqi
invasion in Op.
Desert Shield
U.S. restores
Kuwaiti govt. in
Desert Storm
Britain provides
troops, 36
combat, 3 recon
aircraft, and large
naval fleet to
Saudi Arabia for
Op. Desert Shield
UK troops, air,
naval, support for
Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait
Morocco
provides ground
& mechanized
infantry troops
for Op. Desert
Shield
Egypt provides
ground &
paratroops &
combat aircraft
for Op. Desert
Shield
Egyptian troops
part of Persian
Gulf Coalition in
Kuwait

Honduras

Kuwait

08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Honduras troops
part of Persian
Gulf Coalition in
Kuwait

Romania

Kuwait

08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

Bahrain

Kuwait

Sweden

Kuwait

08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory
08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory
08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

United Arab
Emirates

Kuwait

08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Oman

Kuwait

08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Romania
provides medical
team & NBC
experts as part of
the Persian Gulf
Coalition
Saudi Arabia aids
in Persian Gulf
Coalition
Bahrain troops
part of Persian
Gulf in Kuwait
Qatar provides
troops as part of
Persian Gulf
Coalition
UAE troops in
Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait
Oman provides
troops as part of
Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait

Argentina

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Argentina

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic
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Canada provides
18 combat
aircraft & 3 ships
to Saudi Arabia
for Op. Desert
Shield
Argentina
provides 1
destroyer to
Saudi Arabia for
Op. Desert Shield

Netherlands

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Belgium

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Spain

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

France

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

France

Kuwait

08/13/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Portugal

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Czechoslovakia

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Italy

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic
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Netherlands gives
18 combat
aircraft & 2 frig
& 1 supply ship
for Op. Desert
Shield
Belgium provides
transport aircraft
& 4 ships for
Saudi Arabia in
Op. Desert Shield
Spain provides
one ship for Op.
Desert Shied
France provides
troops & Legion,
32 combat
aircraft, and large
carrier groups to
Saudi Arabia for
Op. Desert Shield
French troops,
air, navy part of
Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait
Portugal provides
supply ship for
Op. Desert Shield
Czech Republic
provide a
chemical defense
unit & hospital
unit to Saudi
Arable for Op.
Desert Shield
Italy provides 8
combat aircraft, 2
frig, 1 supply
ship to Saudi
Arabia for Op.
Desert Shield

Greece

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

USSR

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Sweden

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Diplomatic

Denmark

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Senegal

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Niger

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Syria

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Kuwait

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic
Diplomatic
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Greece provides
1 frigate to Saudi
Arabia for Op.
Desert Shield
Soviet Union
provides guarded
missile destroyer,
anti-sub warfare
ship, 2 supply
ships for Op.
Desert Shield
Sweden
evacuates foreign
national from
Saudi Arabia
Denmark
provides 1
warship to Saudi
Arabia for Op.
Desert Shield
Senegal provides
500 troops for
Op. Desert Shield
Niger provides
infantry troops in
Op. Desert Shield
Syria in Saudi
Arabia to protect
it from Iraqi
invasion in Op.
Desert Shield
Kuwait provides
troops through
the Gulf Council
and 25-30 combat
aircraft

Bahrain

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Sweden

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

United Arab
Emirates

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Oman

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Pakistan

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Strategic

Bangladesh

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

Australia

Saudi
Arabia

08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic
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Bahrain provides
troops to Saudi
Arabia through
Gulf Council
Qatar provides
troops as a Gulf
council member
in Op. Desert
Shield
UAE in Saudi
Arabia to protect
it from Iraqi
invasion in Op.
Desert Shield
Oman contributes
troops through
gulf council in
Op. Desert Shield
Pakistan
intervenes in
Saudi Arabia to
protect Mecca
and Medina from
potential Iraqi
invasion
Bangladesh
provides troops
for Saudi Arabia
for Op. Desert
Shield
Australia
provides 2
frigates and 1
supply ship to
Saudi Arabia for
Op. Desert Shield

08/13/190

New Zealand

Saudi
Arabia

01/15/1991 Economic
Strategic

New Zealand
contributes a
hospital team and
one medical
transport aircraft
for Op. Desert
Shield

Morocco

Kuwait

08/14/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Pakistan

Kuwait

08/28/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Senegal

Kuwait

09/04/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Czechoslovakia

Kuwait

09/25/1991 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Syria

Kuwait

11/04/1991 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Niger

Kuwait

11/15/1990 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Sierra Leone

Kuwait

11/16/1991 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Morocco troops
part of Persian
Gulf Coalition in
Kuwait
Pakistan provides
troops as part of
Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait
Senegal provides
troops for Persian
Gulf Coalition in
Kuwait
Czech troops part
of Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait
Syrian troops in
Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait
Niger provides
troops as part of
Persian Gulf
Coalition
Sierra Leone
provides medical
team and troops
for coalition in
Kuwait
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Iraq

Israel

01/18/1991 02/28/1991 Strategic

Netherlands

Kuwait

02/09/1991 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

Afghanistan

Kuwait

02/11/1991 04/06/1991 Economic
Strategic
Territory

United States

Iraq

02/22/1991 02/28/1991 Policy
Economic
Strategic

United Kingdom

Iraq

France

Iraq

02/22/1991 02/28/1991 Policy
Economic
Strategic
02/22/1991 02/28/1991 Policy
Economic
Strategy

United Nations

Iraq

United Nations

Kuwait

U.S./U.K./France
Turkey

Iraq

Germany

Iran

04/03/1991 09/30/2003 Policy
Economic
Strategy
04/03/1991 09/30/2003 Economic
Strategic
Humanitarian
04/09/1991 12/31/1996 Policy
Social
Humanitarian

04/24/1991 ---
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Social
Humanitarian

Iraqi scud attack
against Israel
Netherlands
provides air
defense batteries
as part of
coalition in
Kuwait
Afghan. troops
aid Persian Gulf
Coalition in
Kuwait
U.S. moves
troops into Iraq
from Saudi
Arabia
Britain moves
into Iraq from
Saudi Arabia
France moves
troops into Iraq
from Saudi
Arabia
UN in Iraq for
peacekeeping on
Kuwaiti border
UN in Iraq for
peacekeeping on
Kuwaiti border
U.S./U.K./France
under operation
Provide Comfort
in N. Iraq for
Kurd
humanitarian aid
Germany sets up
relief base in Iran
for Iraqi refugees

USSR

Afghanistan 07/31/1991 12/31/1995 Pursuit

Turkey

Iraq

08/05/1991 07/06/2003 Pursuit

Iran

Iraq

04/05/1992 04/05/1992 Pursuit

Iran

United
Arab
Emirates

04/10/1992 ---

Strategic
Territory

U.S./U.K./ France Iraq

08/27/1992 03/19/2003 Policy
Social
Economic
Strategic
Humanitarian

Saudi Arabia

Qatar

09/30/1992 12/20/1992 Territory

Iraq

Kuwait

01/10/1993 01/11/1993 Economic

Iran

Iraq

03/14/1993 08/08/1993 Pursuit

Turkey

Iran

01/28/1994 01/28/1994 Pursuit
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Russia attacks
rebel bases in
Afghanistan
Turkish ground
and air attacks on
Kurds in Iraq,
intermittent but
within 6 months
of each other
Iranian planes
bomb suspected
rebel basis in Iraq
Iran seizes shared
territory from
United Arab
Emirates
US/UK/France
perform
reconnaissance
flyovers & give
humanitarian aid
for Operation
Southern Watch
in S. Iraq
Saudi Arabia
forces attack
Qatar military
post
Iraq crosses into
Kuwait to
retrieve military
equipment
Iranian forces
attack Kurdish
rebel basis in Iraq
Turkey bombs in
Iran

United States

Kuwait

01/08/1994 12/24/1994 Strategic

United Kingdom

Kuwait

01/10/1994 12/24/1994 Economic
Strategic

France

Kuwait

01/11/1994 01/31/1994 Economic
Strategic

Oman

Kuwait

01/11/1994 12/24/1994 Economic
Strategic

Bahrain

Kuwait

01/12/1994 12/24/1994 Economic
Strategic

United Arab
Emirates

Kuwait

01/12/1994 12/24/1994 Economic
Strategic

Iran

Iraq

11/07/1994 11/09/1994 Pursuit

Yemen

Saudi
Arabia

12/07/1995 01/10/1995 Territory

Iran

Iraq

07/27/1996 07/31/1996 Pursuit

United States

Kuwait

09/18/1996 12/15/1996 Economic
Strategic
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U.S. build up in
Kuwait to
respond to Iraqi
border build-up
UK bolster US
forces opposing
Iraq border
buildup
French send
frigate to aid
force in
defending Kuwait
Oman sends
naval forces to
defend Kuwait
Bahrain sends
naval and air
forces to defend
Kuwait
UAE sends
troops and 6
mirages to defend
Kuwait
Iran attacks rebel
bases in Northern
Iraq
Yemen clashes
with Saudi
Arabia over illdefined
demarcation line
Iran carries out
raids against
Kurdish rebels in
Iraq
US buildup of
troops in Kuwait
after Iraq‟s
provocation

U.S./U.K./Turkey

Iraq

01/01/1997 05/01/2003 Policy
Social
Humanitarian

Iran

Iraq

09/29/1997 09/29/1997 Pursuit

India

Pakistan

04/20/1998 04/20/1998 Territory

United States

Afghanistan 08/20/1998 08/20/1998 Policy
Strategy

Pakistan

Afghanistan 09/16/1998 09/18/1998 Strategy

Turkey

Iran

07/19/1999 07/19/1999 Pursuit
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Op. Northern
Watch to defend
no-fly zone in
Northern Iraq and
provide
humanitarian aid
to Kurds in N.
Iraq
Iran carries out
air raids against
opposition group
in Iraq
Indian troops fire
on Pakistan
troops along
Kashmir border
U.S. uses cruise
missiles to attack
suspected
terrorist facilities
Pakistan air raids
intended to aid
Taliban
government
Turkish air raids
against PKK in
Iran

APPENDIX B:
CIVIL WARS, COW DATA SET
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War
Name
Second
Chad

War
Type
Civil
war over
local
issues
Hama
Civil
war for
central
control
Fourth
Civil
Lebanese war over
Civil War central
control
Fifth
Civil
Iraqi
war over
Kurds
local
issues
South
Civil
Yemen
war for
central
control
Fifth
Civil
Lebanese war for
central
control
Second
Civil
Afghan
war for
Mujahdn. central
Uprising control
Shiite
and
Kurdish
Algerian
Islamic
Front

Civil
war over
local
issues
Civil
war for
central
control

Side A

Side B

Start
Date
Dec.
1980

End
Date
Oct.
1981

Libya

Citizens
within
state

Syria

Muslim
Brotherhood

Nov.
1981

Feb.
1982

Location
Side A
Fought
Deaths
Africa
1000,
including
target
deaths
Regional 1000
internal

Lebanon

Shi‟ites
& Druze

April
1983

Feb.
1984

Middle
East

Unknown

Unknown

Iraq

Kurds

Jan.
1985

Sept.
1988

Middle
East

Unknown

Unknown

Yemen
Leftist
People
Factions
Republic

Jan.
1986

Jan.
1986

Middle
East

4200

8800

Lebanon

Militias

Feb.
1989

Oct.
1990

Middle
East

Unknown

2500

Afghan.

Mujahdn

Feb.
1989

Oct.
2001

Asia

Unknown

Unknown

Iraq

Shiites &
Kurds

March
1991

March
1991

Middle
East

Unknown

Unknown

Algeria

Islamic
Front

Feb.
1992

June
1992

Middle
East

Unknown

Unknown
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Side B
Deaths
1000,
including
initiator
deaths
2000

South
Civil
Yemeni
war over
Secession local
issues
Iraqi
InterKurd
commun
Intern.
Sixth
Civil
Iraqi
war over
Kurds
local
issues

Yemen

South
Yemen

Feb.
1994

July
1994

Middle
East

Unknown

Unknown

PUK

KDP

Dec.
1994

Aug.
1994

Middle
East

Unknown

Unknown

Iraq

PUK

Aug.
1996

Oct.
1996

Middle
East

Unknown

Unknown
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APPENDIX C:
ALESINA’S FRACTIONALIZATION DATA (EXACT YEAR)
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Country

Year

Ethnic

Language

Religion

Afghanistan

1995

0.7693

0.6141

0.2717

Algeria

1992

0.3394

0.4427

0.0091

Bahrain

1991

0.2021

0.4344

0.5528

Egypt

1998

0.1836

0.0237

0.1979

Iraq

1983

0.3689

0.3694

0.4844

Iran

1995

0.6684

0.7462

0.1152

Israel

1995

0.3436

0.5525

0.3469

Jordan

1993

0.5926

0.0396

0.0659

Kuwait

2001

0.6604

0.3444

0.6745

Lebanon

1996

0.1314

0.1312

0.7886

Libya

1995

0.7920

0.0758

0.0570

Morocco

1994

0.4841

0.4683

0.0035

Oman

1993

0.4373

0.3567

0.4322

Pakistan

1995

0.7098

0.7190

0.3848

Qatar

2001

0.7456

0.4800

0.0950

Saudi Arabia

1995

0.1800

0.0949

0.1270

Syria

1993

0.5399

0.1817

0.4310

Tunisia

2001

0.0394

0.0124

0.0104

UAE

1993

0.6252

0.4874

0.3310

Yemen

1990

0.078

0.0080

0.0023
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